Share price for the 40 %: market-based ranges, deck slide 13
Deploy test site / deploy (push) Successful in 1m4s
Deploy test site / deploy (push) Successful in 1m4s
User, 20 Oct 2026: add a page about possible share prices, do some calculation on normal market data. - docs/finance/share-price.md (new): market data with sources and dates (Damodaran January 2026 EV/EBITDA, P/E and betas for emerging markets and global; Thailand ERP 6.18 % (July 2026); ThaiBMA 10-year 2.30 % (19 Oct 2026); illiquidity discount 20 to 35 %; venture target returns by stage; SET peers SCGP, TPAC, SITHAI, GRAMMY; Thai Civil and Commercial Code on par value and premiums). - Results, all estimates: A founding round at par, pari passu: 542,500 shares of 100 THB at Plan B's 54.25M equity floor, the 40 % ~21.7M THB; B a premium only for documented pre-round costs (102 to 137 THB); C value per share once running at ~163M THB debt: adverse ~0, central 126 to 1,016 THB, favourable 508 to 2,512 THB; D a financial investor today 18 to 236 THB (central); E calculator cross-check. Recommendation: par for the founding round; pre-emption and information rights for the 40 %. - Deck: new slide 13 "Share price: what the 40 % could cost" in both themes, with notes; the ask slide points to it; 17 slides, both PDFs rebuilt; site slide notes trimmed. - README bullet, layout line and Project Status link; total-investment shareholding paragraph links the page.
This commit is contained in:
grabowski committed
1 parent
967e6b1c76
commit
1829dd2aec
6 files changed
+462
-11
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
|
||||
# Share price for the 40 % on offer: market-based ranges (October 2026)
|
||||
|
||||
What a share in the plant company could cost the co-investors who take up
|
||||
the 40 % beside the lead investor, and what it could be worth once the
|
||||
plant runs, worked from public market data (dated and linked below) and
|
||||
the plan's own figures. **This page is not a valuation opinion and not an
|
||||
offer price.** Every result is an estimate or an illustration, given as a
|
||||
range or as scenarios; the share price itself is for the shareholders'
|
||||
agreement (business plan B, section 12.2). Computed 20 October 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
Owning documents: [total investment](total-investment.md#two-plans-a-at-180m-thb-and-b-at-215m-thb-october-2026)
|
||||
(plans and shareholding), [revenue model](revenue-model.md#operating-pictures-of-plan-a-and-plan-b-october-2026)
|
||||
(operating pictures), [BOI](../boi.md) (debt-to-equity and incentives), the
|
||||
[plant and business plan calculator](../fleet-calculator.html) (ten-year
|
||||
cash view) and the [business plan, Plan B](../business-plan/CNX-Vinyl-Business-Plan-B.pdf)
|
||||
(section 12.2, ownership and structure).
|
||||
|
||||
## What is decided
|
||||
|
||||
- **Shareholding** (user, 20 October 2026): the lead investor holds **at
|
||||
least 60 %** of the company that holds the plant and the BOI promotion,
|
||||
so **at most 40 % is for sale**. Ploy Printing (intended strategic
|
||||
co-investor, in cash, in kind or both), any founders' shares and any
|
||||
further co-investor all come out of that 40 %
|
||||
([total investment](total-investment.md#two-plans-a-at-180m-thb-and-b-at-215m-thb-october-2026)).
|
||||
- **Plan B is the proposal**: ~217M THB at the midpoint (201.6M before
|
||||
the 10M to 20M ramp-up reserve), labelled ~215M; ~156M to 277M from the
|
||||
low to the high end of every block; no contingency (~30M at 15 % is not
|
||||
in the price). Plan A (~182M) is the comparison only.
|
||||
- **BOI**: debt-to-equity no higher than 3:1 for the life of the
|
||||
privileges, so equity is at least a quarter of the funding: **~54M THB
|
||||
for Plan B** (217 / 4 = 54.25), and the debt at most ~163M. Vinyl
|
||||
pressing is expected in incentive **Group B: no corporate income tax
|
||||
holiday on the core activity**; upgrade measures (automation, R&D) may
|
||||
add limited exemptions, to be structured by a BOI consultant
|
||||
([BOI](../boi.md)). This page uses the 20 % Thai corporate tax rate.
|
||||
- **Operating picture, Plan B, mature year at 60 % specials**
|
||||
([revenue model](revenue-model.md#operating-pictures-of-plan-a-and-plan-b-october-2026)):
|
||||
revenue 2.28 / 3.65 / 5.41M USD, EBITDA 0.23 / 1.73 / 3.79M USD,
|
||||
operating profit -0.55 / 1.24 / 3.50M USD (adverse / central /
|
||||
favourable). The central EBITDA margin (~47 %) is far above the 15 to
|
||||
25 % pressing plants earn, so **the adverse column is the honest one**;
|
||||
the central column is used here only with that caveat.
|
||||
- **Calculator, preset planB** ([fleet-calculator.html](../fleet-calculator.html),
|
||||
read 20 October 2026): ten-year cumulative cash -6.56M to +12.92M USD,
|
||||
cash payback in year ~4.2, IRR ~22 % (22.2 %), NPV ~4.7M USD (4.68M).
|
||||
Its basis, from the page source: discount rate **10 %** (input
|
||||
`discRate`, marked estimate), **pre-tax and pre-financing**, no terminal
|
||||
value, "Corporate income tax and BOI's CIT exemptions ... are not
|
||||
modelled", ramp 35 / 70 / 90 % in years 1 to 3.
|
||||
- **FX**: 33 THB/USD (planning rate, total investment).
|
||||
- **No loan terms are on file.** No interest rate, repayment schedule or
|
||||
debt-service figure appears on this page. Where equity value needs net
|
||||
debt, it is shown at the most the 3:1 rule allows (~163M THB, nothing
|
||||
repaid: the conservative case) and at half repaid (~81M, a sensitivity).
|
||||
|
||||
## Thai company law basics
|
||||
|
||||
From the Civil and Commercial Code (Thai text from the Office of the
|
||||
Council of State with English translation on
|
||||
[ThaiLawOnline](https://www.thailawonline.com/thai-civil-code/section-1105/),
|
||||
cross-checked against the [Siam Legal library](https://library.siam-legal.com/thai-law/civil-and-commercial-code-limited-companies-section-1096-1116/);
|
||||
checked 20 October 2026; to be confirmed by Thai counsel in phase 0):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Section 1117**: a share may not be less than **5 THB**. The par value
|
||||
is otherwise free; 100 THB a share is a common choice and is used below
|
||||
as the worked example (not decided).
|
||||
- **Section 1105**: shares **may not be issued below par**. Issuing above
|
||||
par (a share premium) is permitted **only if the memorandum of
|
||||
association sanctions it**, and the premium is paid with the first
|
||||
payment. The **first payment must be at least 25 %** of par; the rest is
|
||||
called later (sections 1120 and 1121: by the directors, at least 21 days'
|
||||
notice), which fits a round paid in tranches.
|
||||
- **Section 1108** (amended by Act No. 23 B.E. 2565, in force 7 February
|
||||
2023): the statutory meeting ratifies the promoters' contracts and
|
||||
expenses, fixes any payment to promoters, and fixes the shares to be
|
||||
allotted as paid up **otherwise than in money**; the service or property
|
||||
given for them must be described expressly to the meeting. **Section
|
||||
1119**: otherwise every share is paid in money. After formation, new
|
||||
shares paid in kind need a special resolution (**section 1221**). This
|
||||
is the route for founders' work, the lead investor's pre-round costs and
|
||||
Ploy Printing's in-kind contribution.
|
||||
- **Section 1220**: capital is increased by special resolution;
|
||||
**section 1222**: all new shares must first be offered to existing
|
||||
shareholders in proportion to their holdings (statutory pre-emption).
|
||||
- **Section 1194** (amended 2008): a special resolution needs **three
|
||||
quarters of the votes of the shareholders present and entitled to
|
||||
vote**. A 60 % holder alone therefore cannot pass one when the 40 %
|
||||
attends: capital increases, in-kind allotments after formation and
|
||||
changes to the memorandum or articles need part of the 40 %.
|
||||
|
||||
## Market data
|
||||
|
||||
Checked 20 October 2026. Damodaran files are the January 2026 release
|
||||
(dated 5 January 2026) under
|
||||
`https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/`, read with pandas.
|
||||
|
||||
| Item | Value | Source | Data date |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| EV/EBITDA, Emerging Markets, firms with positive EBITDA | Packaging & Container **13.3x** (341 firms); Entertainment 14.9x; Machinery 25.0x; Chemical (Specialty) 16.0x; Total Market 12.3x | Damodaran, [vebitdaemerg.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/vebitdaemerg.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| EV/EBITDA, Global (cross-check) | 9.6x; 18.7x; 16.9x; 13.1x; 14.7x (same order) | [vebitdaGlobal.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/vebitdaGlobal.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| P/E, aggregate market cap / net income of money-making firms, EM (cross-check) | 18.9x; 18.8x; 35.7x; 24.8x; 16.6x | [peemerg.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/peemerg.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| P/E, same basis, Global | 16.2x; 27.8x; 27.9x; 21.9x; 20.3x | [peGlobal.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/peGlobal.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| Unlevered beta corrected for cash, EM | **0.61**; 1.22; 1.50; 1.11; **0.85** | [betaemerg.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/betaemerg.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| Unlevered beta corrected for cash, Global | 0.58; 0.98; 1.33; 1.04; 0.83 | [betaGlobal.xls](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/betaGlobal.xls) | 5 Jan 2026 |
|
||||
| Thailand equity risk premium | **6.18 %** = mature market 4.20 % + country risk premium 1.98 % (Moody's Baa1, rating-based default spread 1.27 %); January 2026 file: 6.30 %; CDS-based alternative 5.04 % | Damodaran, [ctrypremJuly26.xlsx](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/ctrypremJuly26.xlsx) | 1 Jul 2026 (spreads corrected 9 Jul) |
|
||||
| Thai corporate income tax | 20 % | same file, "Country Tax Rates" | 2025 |
|
||||
| Thai government bond yield, 10 years | **2.30 %** | ThaiBMA, [government bond yield curve](https://www.thaibma.or.th/compositerpt/GovYieldCurve.aspx) | 19 Oct 2026 |
|
||||
| Illiquidity discount (DLOM) | Restricted-stock studies **25 to 35 %** (Maher 35.4 % mean, 1969 to 1973; Silber 33.75 % median, 1981 to 1988; Johnson 20 %); after controlling for issuer differences Bajaj et al. ~7 %; pre-IPO transactions ~45 % (Emory), 32 to 75 % (Willamette); conventional practice 20 to 30 %; McCord v. Commissioner (2003): court accepted 20 % | Damodaran, [Marketability and Value: Measuring the Illiquidity Discount](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/liquidity.pdf), pp. 17, 28 to 30, 35 to 36 | July 2005 |
|
||||
| Target returns of venture investors by stage | Start-up 50 to 70 %; **first stage 40 to 60 %**; second stage 35 to 50 %; bridge / IPO 25 to 35 %. Actual returns far lower (20-year early-stage VC 21.4 %, all VC 16.9 %, to 2007), the gap being failure risk | Damodaran, [Valuing Young, Start-up and Growth Companies](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/younggrowth.pdf), Tables 2 and 3, p. 15 (the paper gives no source line for Table 2) | May 2009 |
|
||||
| SET-listed Thai peers, EV/EBITDA and P/E (secondary market-data site) | SCGP (SCG Packaging) 10.1x, 21.0x, EBITDA margin 14.8 %; TPAC (Thai Plaspac) **4.7x**, 5.5x, margin 18.0 %; SITHAI (Srithai Superware) 3.2x, 7.3x; GRAMMY (GMM Grammy, music and media) 8.6x, 51.9x | stockanalysis.com statistics pages, e.g. [SCGP](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/SCGP/statistics/), [TPAC](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/TPAC/statistics/), [SITHAI](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/SITHAI/statistics/), [GRAMMY](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/GRAMMY/statistics/) | 19 to 20 Oct 2026 |
|
||||
|
||||
Not used: a bank lending rate. The methods below need none, and none is on
|
||||
file for this project.
|
||||
|
||||
## Method
|
||||
|
||||
All amounts in M THB unless stated; EBITDA converted at 33 THB/USD.
|
||||
|
||||
- **A. Founding round at par, pari passu.** Everyone pays the same price,
|
||||
par, in money (or in kind at the same value). Equity = Plan B's 217M x
|
||||
a quarter (the 3:1 floor), a third, or a half; shares = equity / 100 THB;
|
||||
the lead investor's 60 % and the 40 % in shares and THB. Plan A's floor
|
||||
as the one comparison line.
|
||||
- **B. Development premium.** Work and money spent before the round
|
||||
(phase 0 at 1.3M to 2.6M THB; design, vendor work, the platform
|
||||
software) credited as a pre-money value P of 0, 1.3, 2.6, 5, 10 or 20M.
|
||||
The new cash C is the equity floor (54.25M). Post-money = P + C. With
|
||||
the share count held at the par case (542,500), the cash pays (P + C) /
|
||||
542,500 a share, the developers receive P / that price in shares paid
|
||||
otherwise than in money, and the 40 % costs 0.4 x (P + C). A pre-money
|
||||
credit and shares at par for the same amount give the same ownership;
|
||||
the table shows it as a price because that is how a co-investor sees it.
|
||||
- **C. Value once the plant runs** (mature year, ~year 4 to 5).
|
||||
Enterprise value = mature-year EBITDA x EV/EBITDA; equity = EV minus net
|
||||
debt; minority stake in a private company: less a 20 to 35 % illiquidity
|
||||
discount (the restricted-stock range and the court's 20 %); per share at
|
||||
the floor's 542,500 shares. Three multiples: **4.7x**, the median of the
|
||||
three SET-listed plastics and packaging peers (TPAC, SITHAI, SCGP);
|
||||
**13.3x**, Emerging Markets Packaging & Container, the closest industry;
|
||||
**14.9x**, the median of the five EM industries (Machinery's 25.0x
|
||||
reflects machine builders and is not used on its own). Net debt
|
||||
162.75M (all the debt 3:1 allows, nothing repaid, no cash netted) and
|
||||
81.4M (half repaid). EBITDA: adverse, central, favourable, plus a
|
||||
cross-check at an industry-norm margin: 20 % (the middle of the 15 to
|
||||
25 % in the revenue model; the SET peers earn 15 to 18 %) of central
|
||||
revenue, 0.73M USD.
|
||||
- **D. Price a financial co-investor would pay today (venture-capital
|
||||
method).** Post-money value today = equity value in year 5 from C,
|
||||
before the illiquidity discount (the target returns already price
|
||||
illiquidity and failure), divided by (1 + r) to the fifth. Pre-money =
|
||||
post-money minus the 54.25M paid in; the justified price per share =
|
||||
100 THB x post-money / 54.25M. **Stage: first stage, 40 to 60 %.** The
|
||||
technology is proven (vendor presses, galvanics and cutting lines in
|
||||
use elsewhere) and the product is known, so this is not a start-up
|
||||
inventing a product; but there is no plant, no customer and no
|
||||
validated price (roadmap item 1 is open), so it is not second stage.
|
||||
Start-up rates (50 to 70 %) apply if market validation fails to
|
||||
produce buyer prices; second-stage rates once the plant runs and sells.
|
||||
Cross-check: a CAPM cost of equity, 2.30 % + beta x 6.18 %, with the EM
|
||||
unlevered beta relevered at 3:1 and 20 % tax (beta x (1 + 0.8 x 3)):
|
||||
Packaging & Container 0.61 to **2.08**, cost of equity **15.2 %**; Total
|
||||
Market 0.85 to **2.88**, **20.1 %**. The 10-year yield contains
|
||||
Thailand's default spread; netting it out, as Damodaran does, would
|
||||
lower both by about 1.3 points, so the gross yield is the cautious
|
||||
choice.
|
||||
- **E.** The calculator's project return against these rates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Results
|
||||
|
||||
### A. Founding round at par, pari passu (estimate)
|
||||
|
||||
| Case | Equity | Debt at most (3:1) | Shares at 100 THB | Lead investor, 60 % | Co-investors, 40 % | 25 % first payment |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **Plan B, 3:1 floor** (a quarter of 217M) | **54.25M** | 162.75M | **542,500** | 325,500 shares, **32.6M** | 217,000 shares, **21.7M** | 13.6M |
|
||||
| Plan B, equity a third | 72.3M | 144.7M | ~723,300 | ~434,000 shares, 43.4M | ~289,300 shares, 28.9M | 18.1M |
|
||||
| Plan B, equity a half | 108.5M | 108.5M | 1,085,000 | 651,000 shares, 65.1M | 434,000 shares, 43.4M | 27.1M |
|
||||
| Plan A, 3:1 floor (comparison) | 45.5M | 136.5M | 455,000 | 273,000 shares, 27.3M | 182,000 shares, 18.2M | 11.4M |
|
||||
|
||||
The price is **100 THB a share in every row**; more equity means more
|
||||
shares, not a different price. At the legal minimum par of 5 THB the
|
||||
floor would be 10,850,000 shares at 5 THB: the same money for the same
|
||||
40 %. In practice the registered capital is set to a round figure. The
|
||||
40 % at the floor, ~21.7M THB, matches the plan's "at most ~22M" (total
|
||||
investment, business plan 12.2).
|
||||
|
||||
### B. Development premium (illustrative)
|
||||
|
||||
New cash at the floor, 54.25M; share count held at 542,500.
|
||||
|
||||
| Pre-money credited | Post-money | Price the cash pays | Premium over par | Shares to the developers (share of company) | The 40 % costs |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 0 (par) | 54.3M | 100 THB | 0 % | 0 | 21.7M |
|
||||
| 1.3M (phase 0, low end) | 55.6M | 102 THB | 2.4 % | 12,696 (2.3 %) | 22.2M |
|
||||
| 2.6M (phase 0, high end) | 56.9M | 105 THB | 4.8 % | 24,811 (4.6 %) | 22.7M |
|
||||
| 5M | 59.3M | 109 THB | 9.2 % | 45,781 (8.4 %) | 23.7M |
|
||||
| 10M | 64.3M | 118 THB | 18.4 % | 84,436 (15.6 %) | 25.7M |
|
||||
| 20M | 74.3M | 137 THB | 36.9 % | 146,128 (26.9 %) | 29.7M |
|
||||
|
||||
A premium must rest on documented costs or assets: invoices for the
|
||||
phase 0 work, time records at an agreed rate, the platform code and
|
||||
designs handed to the company. Money already spent on the company's
|
||||
behalf is most simply counted as capital at par or reimbursed as a
|
||||
promoter's expense ratified at the statutory meeting (section 1108);
|
||||
either way it gives the same 2 to 5 % as the phase 0 rows. Credit beyond
|
||||
documented spending is a valuation of work and needs a basis the other
|
||||
shareholders accept. Whose credit it is matters for the 60/40: founders'
|
||||
in-kind shares come out of the 40 % (at 10M they would be 15.6 % of the
|
||||
company, leaving 24.4 % for Ploy Printing and others), the lead
|
||||
investor's out of the 60 %. **For a company without a plant or revenue,
|
||||
the defensible default is par.**
|
||||
|
||||
### C. What a share could be worth once the plant runs (estimate)
|
||||
|
||||
Mature year, net debt **162.75M (nothing repaid)**, 542,500 shares paid at
|
||||
100 THB. Each cell: equity value before the discount; value per share
|
||||
after a 35 % to 20 % illiquidity discount; in brackets, the multiple on
|
||||
the 100 THB paid.
|
||||
|
||||
| Mature-year EBITDA | Thai listed peers, 4.7x | EM packaging, 13.3x | EM industry median, 14.9x |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **Adverse**, 0.23M USD (7.6M THB) | -127.2M: debt exceeds value, **share worth ~0** | -61.6M: **~0** | -49.5M: **~0** |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin, 20 % of central revenue, 0.73M USD (24.1M THB) | -49.8M: **~0** | 158.4M: 190 to 234 THB (1.9 to 2.3x) | 196.7M: 236 to 290 THB (2.4 to 2.9x) |
|
||||
| Central, 1.73M USD (57.1M THB) | 105.0M: 126 to 155 THB (1.3 to 1.5x) | 598.3M: 717 to 882 THB (7.2 to 8.8x) | 689.0M: 826 to 1,016 THB (8.3 to 10.2x) |
|
||||
| Favourable, 3.79M USD (125.1M THB) | 423.8M: 508 to 625 THB (5.1 to 6.3x) | 1,504.4M: 1,803 to 2,219 THB (18 to 22x) | 1,703.3M: 2,041 to 2,512 THB (20 to 25x) |
|
||||
|
||||
Sensitivity, **half the debt repaid** (net debt 81.4M), value per share
|
||||
after the discount:
|
||||
|
||||
| Mature-year EBITDA | 4.7x | 13.3x | 14.9x |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Adverse | ~0 (equity -45.8M) | 24 to 29 THB (0.2 to 0.3x) | 38 to 47 THB (0.4 to 0.5x) |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin | 38 to 47 THB (0.4 to 0.5x) | 287 to 354 THB (2.9 to 3.5x) | 333 to 410 THB (3.3 to 4.1x) |
|
||||
| Central | 223 to 275 THB (2.2 to 2.7x) | 814 to 1,002 THB (8.1 to 10.0x) | 923 to 1,136 THB (9.2 to 11.4x) |
|
||||
| Favourable | 605 to 745 THB (6.1 to 7.5x) | 1,900 to 2,339 THB (19 to 23x) | 2,138 to 2,632 THB (21 to 26x) |
|
||||
|
||||
Read with the caveats: at the maximum debt the adverse case leaves the
|
||||
shares worth nothing at any multiple, and so does an industry-norm
|
||||
margin at Thai listed multiples. Leverage at 3:1 is what makes the
|
||||
central and favourable rows large: equity is a quarter of the funding,
|
||||
so every baht of enterprise value above the debt goes to a small equity
|
||||
base. The choice of multiple moves the result more than anything else:
|
||||
Thai listed plastics and packaging companies trade at 3 to 10x EBITDA,
|
||||
the EM industries at 12 to 25x.
|
||||
|
||||
### D. What a financial co-investor would pay today (estimate)
|
||||
|
||||
Year-5 equity value from C (nothing repaid, before the illiquidity
|
||||
discount), discounted over five years. Price per share justified against
|
||||
par (100 THB); a price above 100 means the round could carry a premium at
|
||||
that return, below 100 means par is already rich.
|
||||
|
||||
| Year-5 equity, central case | First stage 40 % | First stage 60 % | CAPM 15.2 % | CAPM 20.1 % |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 4.7x, 105.0M | post-money 19.5M, **36 THB** | 10.0M, **18 THB** | 51.8M, 96 THB | 42.0M, 77 THB |
|
||||
| 13.3x, 598.3M | 111.2M, **205 THB** | 57.1M, **105 THB** | 295.4M, 544 THB | 239.2M, 441 THB |
|
||||
| 14.9x, 689.0M | 128.1M, **236 THB** | 65.7M, **121 THB** | 340.2M, 627 THB | 275.5M, 508 THB |
|
||||
|
||||
Other cases at the first-stage rates (40 % / 60 %): **adverse 0 at every
|
||||
multiple**; industry-norm margin 0 at 4.7x, 54 / 28 THB at 13.3x, 67 /
|
||||
35 THB at 14.9x; favourable 145 / 75 THB at 4.7x, 516 / 264 THB at 13.3x,
|
||||
584 / 299 THB at 14.9x. So a purely financial investor at first-stage
|
||||
target returns would pay **about par (105 to 236 THB) only if it believes
|
||||
the central case and an EM-industry multiple**; on the Thai listed
|
||||
multiple, or at an industry-norm margin, par is already rich (18 to 67
|
||||
THB). Pre-money values: negative wherever the price is below 100 (for
|
||||
example -44.2M at 4.7x and 60 %), +2.8M to +73.9M for the central case at
|
||||
the EM multiples.
|
||||
|
||||
### E. Cross-check with the calculator
|
||||
|
||||
The calculator's ~22 % IRR and ~4.7M USD NPV at 10 % are a project return
|
||||
on the whole 6.56M USD, before tax and financing: it clears the
|
||||
unlevered cost of capital the market data give (2.30 % + 0.61 to 0.85 x
|
||||
6.18 % = 6.1 to 7.5 %) and the calculator's own 10 %, but sits well below
|
||||
the 40 to 60 % first-stage targets, so the calculator alone would not
|
||||
support a premium to a financial investor. Equity funded at 3:1 earns
|
||||
more than the project when the plant earns more than its loans cost and
|
||||
loses faster when it does not (the adverse rows in C); with no loan terms
|
||||
on file, no equity IRR is stated here.
|
||||
|
||||
## What it means
|
||||
|
||||
- **A founding round pari passu at par is the defensible default.** Until
|
||||
the plant exists, a share is worth the cash behind it. At par (100 THB)
|
||||
the 40 % costs ~21.7M THB at the 3:1 equity floor, ~28.9M at a third and
|
||||
~43.4M at a half, for 217,000, ~289,300 or 434,000 shares; the lead
|
||||
investor's 60 % costs one and a half times as much at the same price.
|
||||
The memorandum needs no premium clause for this.
|
||||
- **A development premium only for documented costs or assets.** Phase 0
|
||||
money (1.3M to 2.6M THB) is worth 2 to 5 % of the floor round and is
|
||||
most simply counted as capital at par. Anything above documented
|
||||
spending is a valuation of work; in-kind shares need their description
|
||||
before the statutory meeting (section 1108) or a special resolution
|
||||
later (section 1221), and a premium needs the memorandum's sanction
|
||||
(section 1105).
|
||||
- **Later entrants pay a market-based price.** Once the plant runs and
|
||||
its accounts show the real EBITDA, the market multiples put a share
|
||||
anywhere from nothing to many times par, so shares issued after the
|
||||
founding round should be priced from results (C and D with actual
|
||||
figures), not at par. Statutory pre-emption (section 1222) lets the
|
||||
founding shareholders keep their share of such a round.
|
||||
- **The adverse case shows why co-investors need protection.** At the
|
||||
maximum debt the 3:1 rule allows, the adverse case and an
|
||||
industry-norm margin at Thai listed multiples leave the shares worth
|
||||
nothing, while the lead investor controls 60 % of the votes. Items for
|
||||
the shareholders' agreement: keep statutory pre-emption and do not
|
||||
waive it in the articles; information rights (monthly management
|
||||
accounts, the BOI progress and annual reports, the lender's reports
|
||||
once loans exist); a board seat or observer for the 40 %; reserved
|
||||
matters; and keep the three-quarters threshold for special resolutions
|
||||
(section 1194), which already gives the 40 % a say on capital increases,
|
||||
in-kind allotments and changes to the memorandum. Ploy Printing as a
|
||||
supplier and the founders as operators have reasons to hold at par that
|
||||
a purely financial investor does not (D).
|
||||
|
||||
## Caveats
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a valuation opinion, not an offer price.** Ranges and scenarios
|
||||
from public data and the plan's estimates, for discussion. No share
|
||||
price is agreed; it goes into the shareholders' agreement.
|
||||
- **No loan terms are on file.** Net debt is the most the 3:1 rule allows
|
||||
and one sensitivity; no interest rate, schedule or debt-service figure
|
||||
is assumed. Interest and repayment would change the year-5 net debt
|
||||
either way.
|
||||
- **The extra cost of specials is not modelled** in the revenue model's
|
||||
direct cost, so every EBITDA here is an upper bound until compound
|
||||
quotes exist.
|
||||
- **Central is optimistic, adverse is honest.** The central EBITDA margin
|
||||
(~47 %) is far above the 15 to 25 % pressing plants earn and the 15 to
|
||||
18 % of the SET peers; the industry-norm row shows the difference.
|
||||
- **Contingency is not in the price.** At 15 % (~30M THB) a cost overrun
|
||||
funded by equity at par adds shares at 100 THB; funded by debt, it
|
||||
raises net debt and lowers every value in C and D.
|
||||
- **Market multiples are for listed companies**, most of them far larger
|
||||
than this plant; a small private company would usually be priced below
|
||||
them (estimate). The illiquidity discount covers
|
||||
part of that, not all. Damodaran's Emerging Markets set (27,360 firms)
|
||||
spans many countries and is not a Thai benchmark; the Thai listed peers
|
||||
are only three plastics and packaging companies, read from a secondary
|
||||
market-data site.
|
||||
- **Taxes and BOI**: EV/EBITDA is a pre-tax measure; the calculator is
|
||||
pre-tax and pre-financing. The tax at 20 % in the CAPM line assumes no
|
||||
CIT holiday on the core activity (Group B, [BOI](../boi.md)); any
|
||||
upgrade-measure exemption would raise after-tax values somewhat.
|
||||
- **Timing**: year 5 after the round is the plant's third or fourth year
|
||||
of sales (the build takes ~1.5 to 2 years), so a mature-year EBITDA by
|
||||
then is itself optimistic; each extra year of delay divides D's values
|
||||
by a further 1.4 to 1.6 at the first-stage rates.
|
||||
- **Law**: the Code summaries are from English translations checked
|
||||
against the Thai text online; Thai counsel confirms them in phase 0,
|
||||
along with how BOI counts in-kind capital for the 3:1 ratio.
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ of it were paid in at one share price, the main investor's 60 % would be
|
||||
at least ~32M THB and the 40 % at most ~22M THB (arithmetic only: the
|
||||
share price, the valuation, the total equity above the floor and any
|
||||
founders' or in-kind shares are not agreed). The terms go into the
|
||||
shareholders' agreement (business plan section 12.2).
|
||||
shareholders' agreement (business plan section 12.2). Possible share
|
||||
prices for the 40 % from market data: [share price](share-price.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Decided (user, October 2026): the business plan comes in **two
|
||||
versions** for the investor, built from the same documents:
|
||||
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
+97
-8
@@ -329,8 +329,21 @@ svg.chart .z{stroke:var(--zero);stroke-width:1}
|
||||
.cmp td.n:nth-child(2),.kp td.n:nth-child(2){color:var(--tx);font-weight:600}
|
||||
.cmp td.n:nth-child(3),.kp td.n:nth-child(3){color:var(--mu)}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---------- share price (after BOI and financing) ---------- */
|
||||
.s11b .bd{grid-template-columns:800px 1fr;gap:72px;margin-top:30px}
|
||||
.sp td{font-size:20px;padding:12px 12px}
|
||||
.sp th{padding:0 12px 8px}
|
||||
.sp td:first-child{color:var(--tx)}
|
||||
.s11b .nt{font-size:16px;line-height:1.45;color:var(--mu);margin-top:12px}
|
||||
.dev{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:18px}
|
||||
.dev .card{padding:18px 22px}
|
||||
.dev .v{font-family:var(--serif);font-size:40px;line-height:1.16;color:var(--ac);white-space:nowrap;padding-bottom:.1em}
|
||||
.dev .l{font-size:16.5px;line-height:1.42;color:var(--tx2);margin-top:6px}
|
||||
.vcl{margin-top:26px;font-size:19px;line-height:1.42;color:var(--tx2);padding:14px 20px;border-left:3px solid var(--bf);background:var(--bs);border-radius:0 10px 10px 0}
|
||||
.vcl b{color:var(--tx);font-weight:600}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Palatino's descent runs below the line box: keep it inside the element */
|
||||
h1,h2,.stat .v,.s1 .keys .v,.big3 .v,.tot2 .v,.fin .need .v,.ask .v,.kp4 .v,.chain .nm,.flow .fs .nm,.ppl .nm,.pill4 .h,.feat .h,.unl .h{padding-bottom:.1em}
|
||||
h1,h2,.stat .v,.s1 .keys .v,.big3 .v,.tot2 .v,.fin .need .v,.ask .v,.kp4 .v,.dev .v,.chain .nm,.flow .fs .nm,.ppl .nm,.pill4 .h,.feat .h,.unl .h{padding-bottom:.1em}
|
||||
h1{padding-bottom:.14em}
|
||||
|
||||
/* screenshots of the web tools: a dark and a light version, swapped with the theme */
|
||||
@@ -593,7 +606,7 @@ body.pvmode .stage,body.pvmode .ctl{display:none}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<p class="src"><b>Source:</b> business plan B, sections 6.1 and 6.2; site-candidates.md; scale.md; crane-workshop-tours.md; Payap rezoning: land-listings/payap/rezoning-2026-10-20.md (Town Planning Act B.E. 2562, section 35; the planning department's amendment work plan, ~70 to 82 weeks). Render: fleet-calculator.html, Plan B preset (figure 9). The 60 × 25 m hall is the Mueang Chi design; the layout is fixed once a plot passes zoning and lease-ability.</p>
|
||||
<footer class="ft"><span>CNX Vinyl · Investment proposal, Plan B (~215M THB) · Draft for discussion, October 2026</span><span class="pg"></span></footer>
|
||||
<aside class="notes">The strategy is a long lease of raw land with a purpose-built plant on it. That keeps an estimated 12M to 32M THB of land purchase out of the round, but it also means there is no land to pledge: the lease must give the company ownership of the buildings and the right to mortgage or assign them. Mueang Chi in Lamphun is the working candidate; its zoning is still unverified. Payap University land in Chiang Mai remains an option: the plot it first gave is zoned residential, and on 20 October Payap said it can be rezoned. That is an amendment of the city plan under section 35 of the Town Planning Act, which the planning department itself schedules at about 16 to 19 months, so it would move first production unless the request starts now. The next step is to ask Payap for the plot and the planning office's answer in writing. Plan B builds the crane and the visitor corridor from the start. The render shows the calculator's Payap scenario layout, not a decided site. Sources: business plan B, sections 6.1 and 6.2; site-candidates.md.</aside>
|
||||
<aside class="notes">The strategy is a long lease of raw land with a purpose-built plant: it keeps an estimated 12M to 32M THB of land purchase out of the round, but there is no land to pledge, so the lease must give the company the buildings and the right to mortgage them. Mueang Chi in Lamphun is the working candidate; its zoning is still unverified. Payap University land in Chiang Mai stays an option: its first plot is zoned residential, and Payap says it can be rezoned. That is a city-plan amendment the planning department schedules at about 16 to 19 months, so it would move first production unless it starts now; we need the plot and the planning office's answer in writing. Sources: business plan B, sections 6.1 and 6.2; site-candidates.md.</aside>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- 7 -->
|
||||
@@ -796,7 +809,7 @@ body.pvmode .stage,body.pvmode .ctl{display:none}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<dl class="dl" style="margin-top:16px;grid-template-columns:130px 1fr;gap:12px 18px">
|
||||
<dt>Collateral</dt><dd style="font-size:17.5px">The machinery and equipment, in Plan B including the owned PV array and battery. The building only if the lease grants its ownership and the right to mortgage it. No land collateral: the site is a long lease of raw land.</dd>
|
||||
<dt>Use of funds</dt><dd style="font-size:17.5px">Equipment (presses, metal path, metrology, lab) ~85M THB; building, crane, workshop and corridor ~40M; utilities ~35M; solar and battery ~15M; software, cassette and CD-R, freight, working capital and phase 0 ~28M (block midpoints <span class="e">est.</span>), plus the reserve, in tranches (slide 16).</dd>
|
||||
<dt>Use of funds</dt><dd style="font-size:17.5px">Equipment (presses, metal path, metrology, lab) ~85M THB; building, crane, workshop and corridor ~40M; utilities ~35M; solar and battery ~15M; software, cassette and CD-R, freight, working capital and phase 0 ~28M (block midpoints <span class="e">est.</span>), plus the reserve, in tranches (slide 17).</dd>
|
||||
</dl>
|
||||
<p class="tbd">Financing structure to be agreed: no loan terms, interest rate or debt-service figures are on file.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@@ -806,6 +819,40 @@ body.pvmode .stage,body.pvmode .ctl{display:none}
|
||||
<aside class="notes">Vinyl pressing lands in BOI Group B: duty-free machinery, full foreign ownership and work permits, no tax holiday on the core activity. Solar is no longer promoted; Plan B owns its array for the bill. The condition that shapes financing is debt-to-equity no higher than 3:1: at least a quarter of Plan B's 217M, about 54M THB, is equity. The lead investor holds at least 60 % of the company, so at most 40 % is open to co-investors; at that floor and one share price, about 32M and 22M THB, arithmetic only. No loan terms are on file. Collateral: machinery, array, battery; the land is leased. Sources: boi.md; business plan B, sections 7.1 and 12.2.</aside>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- share price, after BOI and financing -->
|
||||
<section class="slide s11b" data-title="Share price">
|
||||
<div class="kicker"><i class="disc"></i>Share price: what the 40 % could cost</div>
|
||||
<h2>At par, the 40 % costs ~21.7M THB; what it is worth later is a range</h2>
|
||||
<div class="bd">
|
||||
<div>
|
||||
<h3>Founding round at par, pari passu: Plan B at the 3:1 equity floor</h3>
|
||||
<table class="tb sp">
|
||||
<tr><th>100 THB a share <span class="e">example</span></th><th class="n">Shares</th><th class="n">THB</th></tr>
|
||||
<tr><td>The lead investor, at least 60 %</td><td class="n">325,500</td><td class="n">32.6M</td></tr>
|
||||
<tr><td>Co-investors, at most 40 %</td><td class="n">217,000</td><td class="n ac">21.7M</td></tr>
|
||||
<tr class="tot"><td>Equity at the floor: a quarter of ~217M</td><td class="n">542,500</td><td class="n">54.25M</td></tr>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
<p class="nt">With a third or half of the funding as equity the price stays 100 THB and the 40 % costs ~28.9M or ~43.4M. Thai law: no shares below par, par at least 5 THB, a premium only if the memorandum allows it.</p>
|
||||
<h3 style="margin-top:34px">Development premium, only for documented costs</h3>
|
||||
<div class="dev">
|
||||
<div class="card"><div class="v">105 THB <span class="e">+5 %</span></div><div class="l">phase 0 spending, 2.6M THB, credited: the 40 % costs 22.7M</div></div>
|
||||
<div class="card"><div class="v">118 THB <span class="e">+18 %</span></div><div class="l">10M THB credited for pre-round work: the 40 % costs 25.7M</div></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<p class="vcl"><b>A financial co-investor today</b> (venture-capital method, first-stage target return 40 to 60 %, central case in year 5): <b>18 to 236 THB a share</b> depending on the multiple; nothing in the adverse case.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div>
|
||||
<h3>Value of one 100 THB share once the plant runs <span class="e">est.</span></h3>
|
||||
<div class="legend" style="margin-bottom:6px"><span><i style="background:var(--acf)"></i>Range across market multiples, after the illiquidity discount</span><span><i style="background:transparent;height:2px;border-top:2px dashed var(--bf);border-radius:0;vertical-align:4px"></i>Par paid</span></div>
|
||||
<svg class="chart" id="chShare" width="840" height="448" viewBox="0 0 840 448" role="img" aria-label="Value per share once the plant runs, by case, against the par price paid"></svg>
|
||||
<p class="nt">EV/EBITDA 4.7x (Thai listed plastics and packaging) to 14.9x (emerging-market industries), less a 20 to 35 % discount for a private minority stake; net debt the most 3:1 allows, ~163M THB; 542,500 shares.</p>
|
||||
<div class="card warn" style="margin-top:16px;padding:16px 22px"><p class="t" style="font-size:17px"><b>Ranges, not a valuation or an offer price.</b> The adverse case is the honest one: the central margin (~47 %) is far above the 15 to 25 % plants earn. No loan terms are on file; co-investors need pre-emption and information rights.</p></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<p class="src"><b>Source:</b> share-price.md (October 2026); total-investment.md "Two plans"; revenue-model.md "Operating pictures"; Damodaran industry EV/EBITDA and betas (January 2026), country risk premiums (July 2026), illiquidity discount (2005), venture target returns (2009); ThaiBMA 10-year yield 2.30 % (19 October 2026); SET peers via stockanalysis.com (20 October 2026); Civil and Commercial Code ss. 1105, 1117, 1222. Estimates.</p>
|
||||
<footer class="ft"><span>CNX Vinyl · Investment proposal, Plan B (~215M THB) · Draft for discussion, October 2026</span><span class="pg"></span></footer>
|
||||
<aside class="notes">Before the plant exists a share is worth the cash behind it, so the defensible founding price is par, the same for everyone. At 100 THB a share and the 54M THB equity floor, the 40 % is 217,000 shares, about 21.7M THB. Crediting documented phase 0 spending adds 2 to 5 %; credit beyond that needs a documented basis. Once the plant runs, market multiples put a share anywhere from nothing in the adverse case to many times par in the central case; a financial investor at venture target returns would pay at most about par today. Hence pre-emption and information rights for the 40 %. No loan terms are on file. Sources: share-price.md; revenue-model.md.</aside>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- 13 -->
|
||||
<section class="slide s12" data-title="Schedule">
|
||||
<div class="kicker"><i class="disc"></i>Schedule</div>
|
||||
@@ -906,7 +953,7 @@ body.pvmode .stage,body.pvmode .ctl{display:none}
|
||||
<div>
|
||||
<div class="ask" style="display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:44px;align-items:start">
|
||||
<div><h3>Now: phase 0</h3><div class="v">1.3M to 2.6M THB</div><p class="s" style="margin-top:8px">~USD 40k to 80k over 3 to 6 months, part of the plan price: the BOI consultant, Thai counsel for the lease, zoning and the shareholders' agreement, a soil test, the quotes.</p></div>
|
||||
<div><h3>On offer to co-investors</h3><div class="v">Up to 40 %</div><p class="s" style="margin-top:8px">of the company, beside the lead investor's at least 60 %: Ploy Printing, the founders, others. Share price and valuation not agreed; terms in the shareholders' agreement.</p></div>
|
||||
<div><h3>On offer to co-investors</h3><div class="v">Up to 40 %</div><p class="s" style="margin-top:8px">of the company, beside the lead investor's at least 60 %: Ploy Printing, the founders, others. Share price not agreed: par is the default, ranges on slide 13; terms in the shareholders' agreement.</p></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<h3 style="margin-top:24px">Then Plan B at ~215M THB in tranches: share of the investment before the reserve <span class="e">est.</span></h3>
|
||||
<table class="tb tr">
|
||||
@@ -944,14 +991,14 @@ body.pvmode .stage,body.pvmode .ctl{display:none}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<p class="src"><b>Source:</b> business plan B, sections 8.3, 12.2, 14.1 and 14.2; total-investment.md "Two plans" (shareholding); roadmap.md phases 0 to 2. Tranche amounts are the shares applied to Plan B's ~201.6M THB before the reserve (arithmetic). Gates before any order: market validation, the BOI certificate, and land (zoning, lease terms, soil).</p>
|
||||
<footer class="ft"><span>CNX Vinyl · Investment proposal, Plan B (~215M THB) · Draft for discussion, October 2026</span><span class="pg"></span></footer>
|
||||
<aside class="notes">Now: approve phase 0, about 1.3M to 2.6M THB over three to six months, for the BOI consultant, counsel for the lease and the shareholders' agreement, the soil test and the quotes. Then, once validation, the BOI certificate and the land gates clear, a commitment in principle to Plan B at about 215M THB, released in tranches. On offer to co-investors: up to 40 % of the company, as the lead investor holds at least 60 %; share price and valuation are not agreed. Decisions: the equity and debt mix within 3:1, the shareholders' agreement, funding quotes that land high. Why not A? It stays on file as the lowest-capital variant. Sources: business plan B, sections 8.3, 12.2 and 14.</aside>
|
||||
<aside class="notes">Now: approve phase 0, about 1.3M to 2.6M THB over three to six months: the BOI consultant, counsel for the lease and the shareholders' agreement, the soil test and the quotes. Then, once validation, the BOI certificate and the land gates clear, a commitment in principle to Plan B at about 215M THB, released in tranches. On offer to co-investors: up to 40 %, as the lead investor holds at least 60 %; share price not agreed, par the default (slide 13). Decisions: the equity and debt mix within 3:1, the shareholders' agreement, funding quotes that land high. Why not A? It stays on file as the lowest-capital variant. Sources: business plan B, sections 8.3, 12.2 and 14.</aside>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<nav class="ctl" id="ctl" aria-label="Slide controls">
|
||||
<button type="button" id="bPrev" title="Previous slide (Left)" aria-label="Previous slide"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M15 5l-7 7 7 7"/></svg></button>
|
||||
<span class="cnt" id="cnt">1 / 16</span>
|
||||
<span class="cnt" id="cnt">1 / 17</span>
|
||||
<button type="button" id="bNext" title="Next slide (Right)" aria-label="Next slide"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M9 5l7 7-7 7"/></svg></button>
|
||||
<span class="sep"></span>
|
||||
<button type="button" id="bOv" title="Overview (O)" aria-label="Overview"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24"><rect x="4" y="4" width="6.5" height="6.5" rx="1"/><rect x="13.5" y="4" width="6.5" height="6.5" rx="1"/><rect x="4" y="13.5" width="6.5" height="6.5" rx="1"/><rect x="13.5" y="13.5" width="6.5" height="6.5" rx="1"/></svg></button>
|
||||
@@ -978,7 +1025,8 @@ const SRC = {
|
||||
bio: "biomass.md; business plan B, sections 1 and 8.4",
|
||||
pv: "sustainability.md 'What ~520 kWp means on the grid'; business plan B, section 1",
|
||||
tl: "project-timeline.md, Gantt (August 2026 calendar)",
|
||||
bp10: "Business plan B, section 10"
|
||||
bp10: "Business plan B, section 10",
|
||||
sp: "share-price.md (October 2026): par round, development premium, value per share (Damodaran EV/EBITDA January 2026, SET peers 20 October 2026, illiquidity discount 20 to 35 %), venture-capital method"
|
||||
};
|
||||
const DATA = {
|
||||
fx: { usdThb: 33, src: "ti" },
|
||||
@@ -1016,6 +1064,19 @@ const DATA = {
|
||||
},
|
||||
steam: { biomass: 0.67, electric: 4.9, src: "bio" },
|
||||
solar: { used: 633, plant: 1036, share: 61, src: "pv" },
|
||||
/* share price for the 40 %: founding round at par (A), development premium (B), value per share once running (C,
|
||||
floor share count, net debt 162.75M, after a 20 to 35 % illiquidity discount), VC-method price today (D) */
|
||||
share: {
|
||||
par: 100, shares: 542500, equity: 54.25, lead: { sh: 325500, thb: 32.55 }, open: { sh: 217000, thb: 21.7 }, src: "sp",
|
||||
dev: [ { pre: 2.6, price: 105, prem: 4.8, cost40: 22.7 }, { pre: 10, price: 118, prem: 18.4, cost40: 25.7 } ],
|
||||
value: { axis: 2600, src: "sp", rows: [
|
||||
{ k: "adv", label: "Adverse", sub: "EBITDA 7.6M THB a year", lo: 0, hi: 0, neg: 1 },
|
||||
{ k: "norm", label: "Industry-norm margin", sub: "20 % of central revenue", lo: 0, hi: 290, x: "up to 2.9x par", faint: 1 },
|
||||
{ k: "cen", label: "Central", sub: "EBITDA 57.1M THB a year", lo: 126, hi: 1016, x: "1.3x to 10x par" },
|
||||
{ k: "fav", label: "Favourable", sub: "EBITDA 125.1M THB a year", lo: 508, hi: 2512, x: "5x to 25x par" }
|
||||
] },
|
||||
vc: { lo: 18, hi: 236, rate: [40, 60], src: "sp" }
|
||||
},
|
||||
gantt: { from: "2026-08-01", to: "2029-07-31", src: "tl", rows: [
|
||||
{ g: "Phase 0", label: "Market validation", s: "2026-08-01", e: "2026-11-29" },
|
||||
{ g: "Phase 0", label: "BOI consultant and application", s: "2026-08-01", e: "2026-12-14" },
|
||||
@@ -1177,6 +1238,34 @@ function chSolar() {
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: W - 2, y: 64, "text-anchor": "end", fill: C.mu, "font-size": 14 }, "~" + D.used + " of ~" + D.plant.toLocaleString("en-US") + " MWh");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* value of one share once running: a bar per case from the lowest to the highest market multiple, par paid as a dashed line */
|
||||
function chShare() {
|
||||
const s = document.getElementById("chShare"); if (!s) return;
|
||||
const S = DATA.share, D = S.value, L = 300, R = 828, T = 36, rh = 94, X = v => L + Math.max(0, v) / D.axis * (R - L);
|
||||
const B = T + D.rows.length * rh, nf = v => v.toLocaleString("en-US");
|
||||
for (const t of [0, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500]) {
|
||||
el(s, "line", { x1: X(t), x2: X(t), y1: T - 4, y2: B, class: t ? "gr" : "ax" });
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: X(t), y: B + 24, "text-anchor": t ? "middle" : "start", "font-size": 14 }, nf(t));
|
||||
}
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: 0, y: B + 24, "font-size": 14, fill: C.dim }, "THB a share");
|
||||
const px = X(S.par);
|
||||
el(s, "line", { x1: px, x2: px, y1: T - 22, y2: B, stroke: C.bf, "stroke-width": 2, "stroke-dasharray": "5 4" });
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: px + 8, y: T - 12, fill: C.b, "font-size": 14, "font-weight": 600 }, "par paid, " + S.par + " THB");
|
||||
D.rows.forEach((r, i) => {
|
||||
const y = T + i * rh;
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: 0, y: y + 38, fill: C.tx, "font-size": 19, "font-weight": 600 }, r.label);
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: 0, y: y + 63, fill: C.mu, "font-size": 15 }, r.sub);
|
||||
el(s, "rect", { x: L, y: y + 44, width: R - L, height: 18, rx: 3, fill: C.track });
|
||||
if (r.neg) {
|
||||
el(s, "rect", { x: L - 1, y: y + 38, width: 6, height: 30, rx: 2, fill: C.negf });
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: px + 10, y: y + 32, fill: C.neg, "font-size": 16.5, "font-weight": 600 }, "~0: the debt exceeds the plant's value at every multiple");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
el(s, "rect", { x: X(r.lo), y: y + 44, width: Math.max(4, X(r.hi) - X(r.lo)), height: 18, rx: 3, fill: C.acf, "fill-opacity": r.faint ? 0.55 : 0.92 });
|
||||
el(s, "text", { x: Math.max(X(r.lo), px + 10), y: y + 32, fill: r.faint ? C.tx2 : C.ac, "font-size": 16.5, "font-weight": 700 }, nf(r.lo) + " to " + nf(r.hi) + " THB \u00b7 " + r.x);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function chGantt() {
|
||||
const s = document.getElementById("chGantt"); if (!s) return;
|
||||
const D = DATA.gantt, L = 390, R = 1700, T = 30, rh = 24;
|
||||
@@ -1435,7 +1524,7 @@ let idle = 0;
|
||||
function wake() { document.body.classList.add("ui"); clearTimeout(idle); idle = setTimeout(() => document.body.classList.remove("ui"), 2600); }
|
||||
|
||||
function init() {
|
||||
chPrice(); chInvest(); chOp(); chCash(); chSteam(); chSolar(); chGantt();
|
||||
chPrice(); chInvest(); chOp(); chCash(); chSteam(); chSolar(); chGantt(); chShare();
|
||||
fit();
|
||||
window.addEventListener("resize", () => { fit(); if (ovOpen) scaleMinis(ov); if (pv) scaleMinis(pv); });
|
||||
document.addEventListener("keydown", onKey);
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user