Files
cnx-network-clan/machines/ns1/configuration.nix
T
Berwn 1cb6f39ea2 Add declarative SNM mail stack on mx1 with DNS-01, DANE, MTA-STS
mx1 runs Simple NixOS Mailserver (Postfix/Dovecot/Rspamd/OpenDKIM) for
cnx.email. The TLS cert is obtained via ACME DNS-01 using a dedicated,
scoped TSIG key (acme_mx1) that ns1 authorizes for only
_acme-challenge.mx1 and _acme-challenge.mta-sts on the cnx.email zone, so
the credential can write nothing else. Mailbox passwords are auto-minted
by a clan vars generator (four-word passphrase + number).

DANE TLSA (3 1 1) is published for _25._tcp.mx1; --reuse-key keeps the
key digest stable across renewals. MTA-STS is enforced via a Caddy vhost
serving the policy on :443 from the same cert (mta-sts SAN). Firewall
opens 25/587/465/143/993/443; 80 stays closed.
2026-06-18 14:47:20 +07:00

141 lines
4.8 KiB
Nix

{
config,
lib,
pkgs,
...
}:
let
domains = import ../../modules/dns/domains.nix;
mesh = import ../../modules/mesh-hosts.nix { inherit config lib; };
hosts = import ../../modules/hosts.nix;
in
{
imports = [
../../modules/dns/authoritative.nix
../../modules/dns/acme-mx1-secret.nix
../../modules/static-ipv6.nix
../../modules/monitoring/exporters.nix
];
clan.core.sops.defaultGroups = [ "admins" ];
# Knot's state dir holds the non-regenerable DNSSEC key material (KSK/ZSK
# private keys in the KASP keystore). Declaring it as clan state makes the
# borgbackup client back it up; losing it forces an emergency DS rollover at
# the registrar. mode 0700 owned by knot, but borg runs as root so it reads it.
clan.core.state.knot.folders = [ "/var/lib/knot" ];
# The borgbackup repo is addressed as `borg@control`; mesh peers have no name
# resolution, so map the control machine name to its ZeroTier mesh address.
networking.hosts.${mesh.hosts.control} = [ "control" ];
# Public IPv6 (from modules/hosts.nix; matches the ns1 AAAA glue); SLAAC
# doesn't bring it up here.
cnx.staticIPv6 = {
enable = true;
address = hosts.${config.networking.hostName}.ipv6;
};
time.timeZone = "Etc/GMT-1"; # UTC+1 (fixed offset, no DST)
services.timesyncd.enable = true;
# ACME DNS-01 (RFC 2136), general key. A dedicated TSIG key scoped by acl_acme
# (referenced by every zone below) to TXT updates at or under _acme-challenge.
# Retrieve the client config with:
# clan vars get ns1 dns-acme-tsig/acme.conf
clan.core.vars.generators.dns-acme-tsig = {
files."acme.conf" = {
secret = true;
owner = "knot";
group = "knot";
};
runtimeInputs = [ pkgs.knot-dns ];
script = ''
keymgr -t acme_ddns hmac-sha256 > "$out"/acme.conf
'';
};
# ACME DNS-01, dedicated mx1 key. A *separate* TSIG key (acme_mx1) that only
# mx1 holds, rendered from the shared secret (generator dns-acme-mx1-secret,
# imported above). acl_acme_mx1 scopes it to TXT updates at exactly
# _acme-challenge.mx1 and _acme-challenge.mta-sts (the mail cert and its
# MTA-STS SAN), and it is attached only to the cnx.email zone below — so this
# credential can write nothing but mx1's own cert challenges.
clan.core.vars.generators.dns-acme-mx1-knot = {
files."acme.conf" = {
secret = true;
owner = "knot";
group = "knot";
};
dependencies = [ "dns-acme-mx1-secret" ];
script = ''
printf 'key:\n - id: acme_mx1\n algorithm: hmac-sha256\n secret: %s\n' \
"$(cat "$in"/dns-acme-mx1-secret/secret)" > "$out"/acme.conf
'';
};
services.knot.keyFiles = [
config.clan.core.vars.generators.dns-acme-tsig.files."acme.conf".path
config.clan.core.vars.generators.dns-acme-mx1-knot.files."acme.conf".path
];
services.knot.settings.acl = [
{
id = "acl_acme";
key = "acme_ddns";
action = [ "update" ];
"update-type" = [ "TXT" ];
"update-owner" = "name";
"update-owner-match" = "sub-or-equal";
"update-owner-name" = [ "_acme-challenge" ];
}
{
id = "acl_acme_mx1";
key = "acme_mx1";
action = [ "update" ];
"update-type" = [ "TXT" ];
"update-owner" = "name";
"update-owner-match" = "sub-or-equal";
"update-owner-name" = [
"_acme-challenge.mx1"
"_acme-challenge.mta-sts"
];
}
];
# Automatic DNSSEC signing policy (primary only). ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 with
# Knot's default key management: the ZSK auto-rolls and the KSK is kept stable,
# so the DS at the registrar only changes on a manual KSK rollover.
services.knot.settings.policy = [
{
id = "cnx";
algorithm = "ecdsap256sha256";
}
];
# ns1 = primary (master): loads each zone from its file and serves it to ns2.
# zonefile-load = difference-no-serial lets us edit records without touching the
# SOA serial; Knot diffs the file, assigns a unixtime serial, signs the zone,
# then notifies ns2 and lets it pull the signed zone via AXFR/IXFR. unixtime is
# strictly monotonic per reload, so two zone versions can never share a serial
# (the failure mode dateserial's 2-digit daily counter allowed after a journal reset).
services.knot.settings.zone = map (d: {
domain = d;
file = ../../modules/dns/zones + "/${d}.zone";
"zonefile-load" = "difference-no-serial";
"zonefile-sync" = "-1";
"journal-content" = "all"; # required by difference-no-serial; holds the live signed zone
"serial-policy" = "unixtime";
"dnssec-signing" = true;
"dnssec-policy" = "cnx";
notify = [ "ns2" ];
# ns2 transfers; acme_ddns does general DNS-01 updates. The dedicated
# acme_mx1 key is attached only to cnx.email, so it can't touch other zones.
acl = [
"acl_ns2"
"acl_acme"
]
++ lib.optionals (d == "cnx.email") [ "acl_acme_mx1" ];
}) domains;
}