8c8e1be451e2f6cd3ba2e27bfac4d812491f88d2
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 grabowski
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caa38dcd0b |
Rebuild the operating roll-up and labour cost from components
Both were flagged in the review and deferred; fixing them properly changes what the model says. Labour - The 0.23-0.40 USD/record line implied 44,000-63,000 THB per head per month, far above northern Thai production rates. - Rebuilt from headcount and wages: 13-19 direct production staff (operators, galvanics, QC, maintenance) at loaded northern Thai rates gives 3.7M-5.4M THB/yr, or 0.08-0.16 USD per record. Build-up shown. - Mastering and cutting engineers excluded as title-services labour; admin and sales moved to overheads where they belong. - Stamper amortisation widened to 0.03-0.12 to match the in-house marginal cost assumed elsewhere on the page. - Direct cost total is now 1.30-2.58 USD (43-85 THB). Operating roll-up - The old EBITDA and operating-profit figures did not reconcile with their own components and showed no loss case anywhere. Replaced with a three-scenario table built from the components, each column internally consistent, with cash overheads and depreciation separated. - The adverse case is EBITDA-positive but does NOT cover depreciation: operating profit -0.32M USD at 1.0M records on the low price and high cost. The previous figures quoted 0.6-1.2M and hid this entirely. Utilisation and price realisation decide solvency, not just upside. - The favourable case is not credible and that is a finding about the cost table rather than the business: 69% EBITDA margin against industry norms of 15-25%, and 47% even at the centre. The direct cost table counts only per-record consumables and direct payroll. Named what is missing (indirect labour, scrap above the reject allowance, water and effluent, inbound freight, inventory carrying, sales commission) and marked the adverse column as the honest one until those lines exist. - Payback restated per scenario: never / 2.3-4.4 yr / 1.0-1.8 yr. The old "5 to 8 years" came from the pre-correction margin. - FX sensitivity and the utilisation bullet updated to match. The table is a sensitivity, not a forecast, and now says so. |
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|
grabowski
|
4deaa2c57c |
Correct errors found by review; hedge unmarked inferences
A four-agent review audited arithmetic, cross-document consistency, epistemic honesty and style. It found substantially more than the manual pass in the previous commit. Errors that changed conclusions, not decimals: Arithmetic - production-timeline: the headline lead times did not reconcile with the stage table on the same page. Launch is 22-49 days (was 21-39), mature 11.5-22 (was 14-20), repress 6.5-11.5. Including gates, launch is 6-17 weeks, not 8-14. - Consequence: at 17 weeks the launch configuration is at parity with EU/US plants, not ahead of them. The page now compares quote to quote rather than a stage sum to a quoted lead time, and says so. - The galvanics turnaround saving is 1.5-5 weeks, not 3-5. - scale.md Duplex capacity 300-600k/yr did not reproduce from its own stated basis; corrected to 175-540k. production-timeline disagreed with scale.md on the same fleet; both now agree. - "300 units is under an hour of pressing" was out by an order of magnitude on the semi-auto line: 5-8 hours. - project-timeline carried two totals for the same quantity. Now 27-33 months throughout, with the Gantt's two ordering breaks fixed. - scale.md: 300 kWp covers 28-45% of consumption, not 20-35%; roof PV stated as both 150-200 and 247 kWp for the same roof; parking canopy dimensions and PV disagreed with the RFQ. - RFQ: fire tank stated 200 m3 where both its geometry (254 m3) and its own mass (250 t) say 250. Drainage now gives total sealed area 66%, not the 46% paving figure, since that is what attenuation needs. - Galvanics payback used only the top of the saving range: 1-5 years, not 1-4. Inference marked as inference - The 22,000 THB stamper figure is an invoice RESIDUAL. It carries lacquer cutting, test pressings, setup and margin, so it is an upper bound on the stamper component, not a measurement. Everything derived from it now says so, and a line-itemised invoice is the top question. - The saving was also benchmarked against the wrong supplier: CNX buys from Stamper Discs, not a Thai reseller. Stated as 175-665 USD until that quote exists. - The stamper-bottleneck hypothesis now names its alternatives. Jacket print runs would produce the same symptom and would constrain CNX equally, which would remove the competitive read entirely. - Competitor capacity relabelled as nameplate times an assumed OEE, with the assumed shift pattern stated; all rows on one 300-day basis. - The fixed/variable decomposition keeps the shape and drops the point estimates: the solve point inside the flat 1000-3000 tier is arbitrary and moves the fixed component by nearly half. - "Nobody in Thailand plates" reduced to "we have found no evidence", with a desk check named as the action. - Cut the USD 450-700k valuation of a competitor's presses entirely. It extrapolated a semi-auto quote onto a different machine, ignored the used market, and supported no decision. - The collaboration payback divided capex by revenue where the same page uses contribution elsewhere: 5-10 years, not 1-3. Missing caveats added - No financing is committed or modelled anywhere in this repo; project-timeline previously asserted money was not a constraint. - Leasing cannot pull the launch forward on its own, since the press chain governs and construction has float against it. - The whole competitive analysis is one buyer, one plant, one afternoon, and the primary evidence is not archived in the repo. - ResurRec is a competitor and may decline to buy from a new entrant. |
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grabowski
|
20c8d283d5 |
Rebase costs on USD/THB; add timelines and first market data
Currency - Base currency moves from EUR to USD and THB throughout. Rates at 5 Aug 2026: 1 USD = 33 THB, 1 EUR = 1.155 USD, 1 GBP = 1.35 USD. EUR/THB lands at ~38, so existing THB research needed no change. - Vendor quotes keep their original currency with a USD/THB equivalent alongside, so they stay checkable against the source PDFs. - Full vision ~4.7-8.9M USD; phased entry ~1.7-2.9M USD. New documents - production-timeline.md: order turnaround stage by stage. Launch 8-14 weeks, mature 5-10, repress 2-3. Quantifies the in-house galvanics turnaround claim the repo had asserted without a number, and flags artwork as an unmodelled fourth approval gate. - project-timeline.md: calendar to first paying release, ~Q4 2028. Critical path is BOI certificate to press order to build to commissioning. Two findings: Newbilt build time is absent from the repo yet carries ~40% of the schedule, and the BOI rule may be over-serialised since duty exemption attaches at importation rather than at contract signature. First market data (ResurRec, Bangkok) - Invoice-derived prices, a factory tour, and a confirmed fleet of one Newbilt Classic 12" automatic plus one semi-automatic. - Price ladder recorded at 300/500/1000-3000/3000+ units. Decomposes to roughly 34-50k THB fixed per title and 535-780 THB variable per unit, which is 4-7x the price this model assumes. - The incumbent presses 230-350k records/yr but buys every stamper as an import. That single constraint plausibly explains their 150-unit floor, their flat discount ladder and their large-run lead time, and it is what an in-house galvanics line attacks. Logged as an open question on whether galvanics should move from phase 5 to phase 1. - Inferences are marked as inferences; the whole set is one buyer and one plant, and the model is deliberately left unrebased until a second data point exists. Corrections - Gross margin arithmetic did not follow from its own inputs. Restated as ~1.95 USD at the midpoint with the 0.75-3.15 spread shown; the previous "40 to 55%" was not supported. - Direct cost low total 1.50 to 1.45 USD; contingency THB high 40M to 38M. - README indexes the construction RFQ, which was missing. |
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grabowski
|
195dbff1f4 |
Add revenue model: 3.2M-5.9M EUR/yr at full capacity, per-record economics
Blended pressing price, direct cost breakdown, margin, EBITDA and payback bands; all arithmetic reviewer-recomputed; adverse payback corner stated honestly alongside mid assumptions |