Correct errors found by review; hedge unmarked inferences

A four-agent review audited arithmetic, cross-document consistency,
epistemic honesty and style. It found substantially more than the
manual pass in the previous commit. Errors that changed conclusions,
not decimals:

Arithmetic
- production-timeline: the headline lead times did not reconcile with
  the stage table on the same page. Launch is 22-49 days (was 21-39),
  mature 11.5-22 (was 14-20), repress 6.5-11.5. Including gates,
  launch is 6-17 weeks, not 8-14.
- Consequence: at 17 weeks the launch configuration is at parity with
  EU/US plants, not ahead of them. The page now compares quote to
  quote rather than a stage sum to a quoted lead time, and says so.
- The galvanics turnaround saving is 1.5-5 weeks, not 3-5.
- scale.md Duplex capacity 300-600k/yr did not reproduce from its own
  stated basis; corrected to 175-540k. production-timeline disagreed
  with scale.md on the same fleet; both now agree.
- "300 units is under an hour of pressing" was out by an order of
  magnitude on the semi-auto line: 5-8 hours.
- project-timeline carried two totals for the same quantity. Now
  27-33 months throughout, with the Gantt's two ordering breaks fixed.
- scale.md: 300 kWp covers 28-45% of consumption, not 20-35%; roof PV
  stated as both 150-200 and 247 kWp for the same roof; parking canopy
  dimensions and PV disagreed with the RFQ.
- RFQ: fire tank stated 200 m3 where both its geometry (254 m3) and
  its own mass (250 t) say 250. Drainage now gives total sealed area
  66%, not the 46% paving figure, since that is what attenuation needs.
- Galvanics payback used only the top of the saving range: 1-5 years,
  not 1-4.

Inference marked as inference
- The 22,000 THB stamper figure is an invoice RESIDUAL. It carries
  lacquer cutting, test pressings, setup and margin, so it is an upper
  bound on the stamper component, not a measurement. Everything derived
  from it now says so, and a line-itemised invoice is the top question.
- The saving was also benchmarked against the wrong supplier: CNX buys
  from Stamper Discs, not a Thai reseller. Stated as 175-665 USD until
  that quote exists.
- The stamper-bottleneck hypothesis now names its alternatives. Jacket
  print runs would produce the same symptom and would constrain CNX
  equally, which would remove the competitive read entirely.
- Competitor capacity relabelled as nameplate times an assumed OEE,
  with the assumed shift pattern stated; all rows on one 300-day basis.
- The fixed/variable decomposition keeps the shape and drops the point
  estimates: the solve point inside the flat 1000-3000 tier is
  arbitrary and moves the fixed component by nearly half.
- "Nobody in Thailand plates" reduced to "we have found no evidence",
  with a desk check named as the action.
- Cut the USD 450-700k valuation of a competitor's presses entirely.
  It extrapolated a semi-auto quote onto a different machine, ignored
  the used market, and supported no decision.
- The collaboration payback divided capex by revenue where the same
  page uses contribution elsewhere: 5-10 years, not 1-3.

Missing caveats added
- No financing is committed or modelled anywhere in this repo;
  project-timeline previously asserted money was not a constraint.
- Leasing cannot pull the launch forward on its own, since the press
  chain governs and construction has float against it.
- The whole competitive analysis is one buyer, one plant, one
  afternoon, and the primary evidence is not archived in the repo.
- ResurRec is a competitor and may decline to buy from a new entrant.

docs/project-timeline.md

@@ -13,11 +13,18 @@ governs the whole schedule.
 
 ## The answer
 
-**First paying release lands around Q4 2028 to Q1 2029 — roughly 27 to
-30 months from today**, on the buy-and-build path with a BOI-funded
-machinery order.
+**First paying release lands around Q4 2028 to mid-2029 — roughly 27 to
+33 months from today**, on the buy-and-build path. The top of that range
+is the honest planning figure while the press build time is unquoted; the
+Gantt below draws the optimistic end.
 
-The critical path is not construction and not money. It is:
+The critical path is not construction. Whether it is **money** is outside
+this page's scope, and that gap should be stated plainly: no financing is
+committed and none is modelled anywhere in this repo, which prices
+1.7–2.9M USD for the launch phase and 4.7–8.9M for the full vision
+without saying where any of it comes from. This calendar assumes capital
+is available when each block is ordered. The critical path it does model
+is:
 
 > **BOI certificate → press order → press build → sea freight →
 > commissioning**
@@ -38,14 +45,14 @@ gantt
     section Gates (Phase 0)
     Market validation / Making Vinyl   :a1, 2026-08-01, 120d
     BOI consultant engaged             :a2, 2026-08-01, 60d
-    BOI application prepared           :a3, after a2, 90d
+    BOI application prepared           :a3, after a2, 75d
     60 rai title check                 :a4, 2026-08-01, 90d
 
     section BOI
     Application filed                  :milestone, m1, 2026-12-15, 0d
     BOI review and analyst meeting     :b1, 2026-12-15, 150d
     Promotion certificate              :milestone, m2, 2027-05-15, 0d
-    Company incorporation              :b2, after m2, 45d
+    Company incorporation              :b2, after m2, 30d
 
     section Land and building
     Zoning and title verification      :c1, 2026-09-01, 90d
@@ -92,8 +99,9 @@ for a built-to-order press system from a small German manufacturer, and
 it is carrying about **40% of the entire schedule**.
 
 If the real figure is 15–18 months — entirely plausible for a shop of
-Newbilt's size with a full order book — first production moves to late
-2029 and the whole plan shifts by half a year.
+Newbilt's size with a full order book — first production moves to
+mid-2029 and the whole plan shifts by six months, or nine at the widest
+corner.
 
 **Action, and it is free:** [roadmap.md](roadmap.md) item 4 already
 calls for a Newbilt re-quote, since the 2024 offer has expired. Add
@@ -177,16 +185,20 @@ only money:
 |---|---|---|
 | Upfront capital | ~0 | 1.0–2.1M USD (34–69M THB) |
 | On the critical path? | No | Yes, with ~3–5 months float |
-| Earliest first production | **~Q1–Q2 2028** | ~Q4 2028–Q1 2029 |
+| Earliest first production | ~Q4 2028, same as build | ~Q4 2028–mid 2029 |
 | Slab rating, 3 t/m² | Must be verified in an existing building; most Thai light-industrial stock will not have it | Specified from the start |
 | 500–1,000 kVA supply | Existing connection, or a PEA upgrade with its own lead time | Designed in |
 | BOI land ownership privilege | Unused | Used |
 | Galvanics effluent, Phase 5 | Landlord's permission needed, and may not be given | Ours to permit |
 
-Leasing pulls the launch forward by roughly **three quarters** and frees
-a seven-figure sum, at the cost of a building that probably compromises
-on the two hardest requirements (floor loading and power) and may block
-the Phase 5 galvanics line entirely. Locating in the Northern Region
+Leasing frees a seven-figure sum but, on this page's own critical path,
+**cannot pull the launch forward on its own** — the press chain governs,
+and construction has only 3–5 months of float against it. Removing an
+item that is not on the critical path does not move the end date. Leasing
+only advances the launch if the **press order** also moves forward, which
+is the BOI question above; the two are one lever, not two. The cost is a
+building that probably compromises on the two hardest requirements (floor
+loading and power) and may block the Phase 5 galvanics line entirely. Locating in the Northern Region
 Industrial Estate, which [boi.md](boi.md) already favours for its shared
 central effluent treatment, is the version of leasing that keeps the
 galvanics option alive.