All-equity funding: shareholders fund the whole plant
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User, 20 Oct 2026: the plan is that the shareholders fund the whole
plant and get shares for that (no bank loan).
- total-investment.md "Two plans": Funding paragraph: Plan B's ~217M
THB paid in as share capital; the lead investor's 60 % at least ~130M,
the 40 % at most ~87M (~121M / ~81M before the reserve; Plan A ~109M /
~73M); capital registered in full and called in instalments against
the tranches; BOI's 3:1 met with no debt; nothing pledged.
- boi.md, README Project Status and the share-price bullet follow.
- Business plan A and B: the ask, the decisions, section 12.2 (funding
bullet replaces the 3:1 equity floor), section 14 and the BOI
requirements paragraph; "not in this plan" now names bank debt; both
rebuilt (63 pages, checked).
- share-price.md re-based: 2,170,000 shares of 100 THB, the 40 % ~86.8M
THB; illustrative calls 25/40/20/15 % against the tranches; premium
rows on 217M; value per share once running with no debt (adverse 11 to
42 THB, central 80 to 314, favourable 176 to 688 per 100 THB paid);
VC method and CAPM recomputed; the calculator's ~22 % IRR is now the
shareholders' pre-tax return (~18 % after tax, rough); missed-call
rules (CCC 1120 to 1125); the levered case kept as "if a loan were
added later".
- Deck: slide 12 (all equity, 60/40 bar ~130M / ~87M, none pledged,
share capital called in instalments), slide 13 (re-based table, chart,
premium cards, VC line), slide 17 (co-investor card, calls) and notes
("lenders" -> "investors"); both PDFs rebuilt; deck verify clean.
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@@ -3,37 +3,49 @@
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What a share in the plant company could cost the co-investors who take up
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the 40 % beside the lead investor, and what it could be worth once the
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plant runs, worked from public market data (dated and linked below) and
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the plan's own figures. **This page is not a valuation opinion and not an
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offer price.** Every result is an estimate or an illustration, given as a
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range or as scenarios; the share price itself is for the shareholders'
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the plan's own figures. The basis is the funding decision of 20 October
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2026: **the shareholders fund the whole plant as share capital, with no
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bank loan**. **This page is not a valuation opinion and not an offer
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price.** Every result is an estimate or an illustration, given as a range
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or as scenarios; the share price itself is for the shareholders'
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agreement (business plan B, section 12.2). Computed 20 October 2026.
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Owning documents: [total investment](total-investment.md#two-plans-a-at-180m-thb-and-b-at-215m-thb-october-2026)
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(plans and shareholding), [revenue model](revenue-model.md#operating-pictures-of-plan-a-and-plan-b-october-2026)
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(plans, shareholding and the Funding paragraph), [revenue model](revenue-model.md#operating-pictures-of-plan-a-and-plan-b-october-2026)
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(operating pictures), [BOI](../boi.md) (debt-to-equity and incentives), the
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[plant and business plan calculator](../fleet-calculator.html) (ten-year
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cash view) and the [business plan, Plan B](../business-plan/CNX-Vinyl-Business-Plan-B.pdf)
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(section 12.2, ownership and structure).
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(sections 8.3, tranches, and 12.2, ownership and structure).
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## What is decided
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- **Funding** (user, 20 October 2026): **the shareholders fund the whole
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plant and get shares for it; no bank loan is planned.** Plan B's ~217M
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THB is paid in as share capital, registered in full and called in
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instalments against the tranches of business plan section 8.3
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([total investment, Funding paragraph](total-investment.md#two-plans-a-at-180m-thb-and-b-at-215m-thb-october-2026)).
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The share price, any founders' or in-kind shares and the call schedule
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are not agreed.
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- **Shareholding** (user, 20 October 2026): the lead investor holds **at
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least 60 %** of the company that holds the plant and the BOI promotion,
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so **at most 40 % is for sale**. Ploy Printing (intended strategic
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co-investor, in cash, in kind or both), any founders' shares and any
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further co-investor all come out of that 40 %
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([total investment](total-investment.md#two-plans-a-at-180m-thb-and-b-at-215m-thb-october-2026)).
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On ~217M of share capital at one price that is at least ~130M THB for
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the lead investor and at most ~87M for the 40 %.
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- **Plan B is the proposal**: ~217M THB at the midpoint (201.6M before
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the 10M to 20M ramp-up reserve), labelled ~215M; ~156M to 277M from the
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low to the high end of every block; no contingency (~30M at 15 % is not
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in the price). Plan A (~182M) is the comparison only.
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- **BOI**: debt-to-equity no higher than 3:1 for the life of the
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privileges, so equity is at least a quarter of the funding: **~54M THB
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for Plan B** (217 / 4 = 54.25), and the debt at most ~163M. Vinyl
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pressing is expected in incentive **Group B: no corporate income tax
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holiday on the core activity**; upgrade measures (automation, R&D) may
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add limited exemptions, to be structured by a BOI consultant
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([BOI](../boi.md)). This page uses the 20 % Thai corporate tax rate.
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privileges. With no debt the ceiling is met with room to spare and no
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longer sets an equity floor; a loan added later would have to stay
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within it. Vinyl pressing is expected in incentive **Group B: no
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corporate income tax holiday on the core activity**; upgrade measures
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(automation, R&D) may add limited exemptions, to be structured by a BOI
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consultant ([BOI](../boi.md)). This page uses the 20 % Thai corporate
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tax rate.
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- **Operating picture, Plan B, mature year at 60 % specials**
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([revenue model](revenue-model.md#operating-pictures-of-plan-a-and-plan-b-october-2026)):
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revenue 2.28 / 3.65 / 5.41M USD, EBITDA 0.23 / 1.73 / 3.79M USD,
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@@ -47,39 +59,55 @@ cash view) and the [business plan, Plan B](../business-plan/CNX-Vinyl-Business-P
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Its basis, from the page source: discount rate **10 %** (input
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`discRate`, marked estimate), **pre-tax and pre-financing**, no terminal
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value, "Corporate income tax and BOI's CIT exemptions ... are not
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modelled", ramp 35 / 70 / 90 % in years 1 to 3.
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modelled", ramp 35 / 70 / 90 % in years 1 to 3, depreciation over 12.5
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years. With no loan, pre-financing is the shareholders' own position.
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- **FX**: 33 THB/USD (planning rate, total investment).
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- **No loan terms are on file.** No interest rate, repayment schedule or
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debt-service figure appears on this page. Where equity value needs net
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debt, it is shown at the most the 3:1 rule allows (~163M THB, nothing
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repaid: the conservative case) and at half repaid (~81M, a sensitivity).
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- **No loan terms are on file, and no loan is planned.** No interest
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rate, repayment schedule or debt-service figure appears on this page.
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The one levered table below ("if a loan were added later") uses the
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most debt the 3:1 rule would allow, nothing repaid, only to show what
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leverage would do to the figures; it is not the plan.
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## Thai company law basics
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From the Civil and Commercial Code (Thai text from the Office of the
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Council of State with English translation on
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[ThaiLawOnline](https://www.thailawonline.com/thai-civil-code/section-1105/),
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cross-checked against the [Siam Legal library](https://library.siam-legal.com/thai-law/civil-and-commercial-code-limited-companies-section-1096-1116/);
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cross-checked against the Siam Legal library, sections
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[1096 to 1116](https://library.siam-legal.com/thai-law/civil-and-commercial-code-limited-companies-section-1096-1116/)
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and [1117 to 1143](https://library.siam-legal.com/thai-law/civil-and-commercial-code-limited-companies-section-1117-1143/);
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checked 20 October 2026; to be confirmed by Thai counsel in phase 0):
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- **Section 1096**: the shareholders' liability is limited to the amount,
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if any, unpaid on their shares. Capital registered but not yet called
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is owed to the company.
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- **Section 1117**: a share may not be less than **5 THB**. The par value
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is otherwise free; 100 THB a share is a common choice and is used below
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as the worked example (not decided).
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- **Section 1105**: shares **may not be issued below par**. Issuing above
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par (a share premium) is permitted **only if the memorandum of
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association sanctions it**, and the premium is paid with the first
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payment. The **first payment must be at least 25 %** of par; the rest is
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called later (sections 1120 and 1121: by the directors, at least 21 days'
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notice), which fits a round paid in tranches.
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payment. The **first payment must be at least 25 %** of par.
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- **Calls on the rest (sections 1120 to 1125)**: unless a general meeting
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decides otherwise, the directors call the unpaid money (1120), with at
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least **21 days' notice by registered letter** (1121). A shareholder who
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misses a call owes interest from the due date (1122); the directors may
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send a second registered notice with a reasonable deadline that can
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warn of forfeiture (1123), then declare the shares forfeited (1124);
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forfeited shares are sold without delay **by public auction**, the
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proceeds pay the call and interest and any surplus goes back to the
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shareholder (1125). This is the frame for calling the share capital in
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instalments against the tranches.
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- **Section 1108** (amended by Act No. 23 B.E. 2565, in force 7 February
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2023): the statutory meeting ratifies the promoters' contracts and
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expenses, fixes any payment to promoters, and fixes the shares to be
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allotted as paid up **otherwise than in money**; the service or property
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given for them must be described expressly to the meeting. **Section
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1119**: otherwise every share is paid in money. After formation, new
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shares paid in kind need a special resolution (**section 1221**). This
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is the route for founders' work, the lead investor's pre-round costs and
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Ploy Printing's in-kind contribution.
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1119**: otherwise every share is paid in money, and no set-off against
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the company is allowed. After formation, new shares paid in kind need a
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special resolution (**section 1221**). This is the route for founders'
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work, the lead investor's pre-round costs and Ploy Printing's in-kind
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contribution.
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- **Section 1220**: capital is increased by special resolution;
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**section 1222**: all new shares must first be offered to existing
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shareholders in proportion to their holdings (statutory pre-emption).
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@@ -110,243 +138,321 @@ Checked 20 October 2026. Damodaran files are the January 2026 release
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| Target returns of venture investors by stage | Start-up 50 to 70 %; **first stage 40 to 60 %**; second stage 35 to 50 %; bridge / IPO 25 to 35 %. Actual returns far lower (20-year early-stage VC 21.4 %, all VC 16.9 %, to 2007), the gap being failure risk | Damodaran, [Valuing Young, Start-up and Growth Companies](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/younggrowth.pdf), Tables 2 and 3, p. 15 (the paper gives no source line for Table 2) | May 2009 |
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| SET-listed Thai peers, EV/EBITDA and P/E (secondary market-data site) | SCGP (SCG Packaging) 10.1x, 21.0x, EBITDA margin 14.8 %; TPAC (Thai Plaspac) **4.7x**, 5.5x, margin 18.0 %; SITHAI (Srithai Superware) 3.2x, 7.3x; GRAMMY (GMM Grammy, music and media) 8.6x, 51.9x | stockanalysis.com statistics pages, e.g. [SCGP](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/SCGP/statistics/), [TPAC](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/TPAC/statistics/), [SITHAI](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/SITHAI/statistics/), [GRAMMY](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/bkk/GRAMMY/statistics/) | 19 to 20 Oct 2026 |
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Not used: a bank lending rate. The methods below need none, and none is on
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file for this project.
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Not used: a bank lending rate. No loan is planned, the methods below need
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none, and none is on file for this project.
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## Method
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All amounts in M THB unless stated; EBITDA converted at 33 THB/USD.
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Multiples are used unrounded (4.69x, 13.33x, 14.92x), so a hand check with
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the rounded figures can differ by 1 or 2 THB a share.
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- **A. Founding round at par, pari passu.** Everyone pays the same price,
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par, in money (or in kind at the same value). Equity = Plan B's 217M x
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a quarter (the 3:1 floor), a third, or a half; shares = equity / 100 THB;
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the lead investor's 60 % and the 40 % in shares and THB. Plan A's floor
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as the one comparison line.
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- **A. Founding round at par, pari passu, all equity.** Everyone pays the
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same price, par, in money (or in kind at the same value). Share capital
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= the plan price; shares = capital / 100 THB; the lead investor's 60 %
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and the 40 % in shares and THB. Plan B at ~217M, Plan B before the
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reserve (201.6M) and Plan A (~182M) as the comparison. The capital is
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registered in full and called in instalments: at least 25 % on
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subscription (section 1105), the rest by the directors (section 1120)
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against the tranche gates of business plan section 8.3.
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- **B. Development premium.** Work and money spent before the round
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(phase 0 at 1.3M to 2.6M THB; design, vendor work, the platform
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software) credited as a pre-money value P of 0, 1.3, 2.6, 5, 10 or 20M.
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The new cash C is the equity floor (54.25M). Post-money = P + C. With
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the share count held at the par case (542,500), the cash pays (P + C) /
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542,500 a share, the developers receive P / that price in shares paid
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The new cash C is Plan B's 217M. Post-money = P + C. With the share
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count held at the par case (2,170,000), the cash pays (P + C) /
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2,170,000 a share, the developers receive P / that price in shares paid
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otherwise than in money, and the 40 % costs 0.4 x (P + C). A pre-money
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credit and shares at par for the same amount give the same ownership;
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the table shows it as a price because that is how a co-investor sees it.
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- **C. Value once the plant runs** (mature year, ~year 4 to 5).
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Enterprise value = mature-year EBITDA x EV/EBITDA; equity = EV minus net
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debt; minority stake in a private company: less a 20 to 35 % illiquidity
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discount (the restricted-stock range and the court's 20 %); per share at
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the floor's 542,500 shares. Three multiples: **4.7x**, the median of the
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three SET-listed plastics and packaging peers (TPAC, SITHAI, SCGP);
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**13.3x**, Emerging Markets Packaging & Container, the closest industry;
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**14.9x**, the median of the five EM industries (Machinery's 25.0x
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reflects machine builders and is not used on its own). Net debt
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162.75M (all the debt 3:1 allows, nothing repaid, no cash netted) and
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81.4M (half repaid). EBITDA: adverse, central, favourable, plus a
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cross-check at an industry-norm margin: 20 % (the middle of the 15 to
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25 % in the revenue model; the SET peers earn 15 to 18 %) of central
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revenue, 0.73M USD.
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Enterprise value = mature-year EBITDA x EV/EBITDA; **net debt 0**, so
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equity value = enterprise value; minority stake in a private company:
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less a 20 to 35 % illiquidity discount (the restricted-stock range and
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the court's 20 %); per share on the 2,170,000 shares. No cash is netted
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either: cash the plant earns by then is assumed paid out or spent on
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growth (the second Duplex is funded from revenue); cash kept in the
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company would add to every value. Three multiples: **4.7x**, the median
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of the three SET-listed plastics and packaging peers (TPAC, SITHAI,
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SCGP); **13.3x**, Emerging Markets Packaging & Container, the closest
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industry; **14.9x**, the median of the five EM industries (Machinery's
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25.0x reflects machine builders and is not used on its own). EBITDA:
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adverse, central, favourable, plus a cross-check at an industry-norm
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margin: 20 % (the middle of the 15 to 25 % in the revenue model; the SET
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peers earn 15 to 18 %) of central revenue, 0.73M USD. One sensitivity
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table shows the same cases if a loan were added later at the 3:1
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ceiling (equity 54.25M, 542,500 shares, debt 162.75M, nothing repaid).
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- **D. Price a financial co-investor would pay today (venture-capital
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method).** Post-money value today = equity value in year 5 from C,
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before the illiquidity discount (the target returns already price
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illiquidity and failure), divided by (1 + r) to the fifth. Pre-money =
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post-money minus the 54.25M paid in; the justified price per share =
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100 THB x post-money / 54.25M. **Stage: first stage, 40 to 60 %.** The
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technology is proven (vendor presses, galvanics and cutting lines in
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use elsewhere) and the product is known, so this is not a start-up
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inventing a product; but there is no plant, no customer and no
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validated price (roadmap item 1 is open), so it is not second stage.
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Start-up rates (50 to 70 %) apply if market validation fails to
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method).** Post-money value today = equity value in year 5 from C
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(net debt 0), before the illiquidity discount (the target returns
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already price illiquidity and failure), divided by (1 + r) to the
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fifth. Pre-money = post-money minus the 217M paid in; the justified
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price per share = 100 THB x post-money / 217M. **Stage: first stage, 40
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to 60 %.** The technology is proven (vendor presses, galvanics and
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cutting lines in use elsewhere) and the product is known, so this is
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not a start-up inventing a product; but there is no plant, no customer
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and no validated price (roadmap item 1 is open), so it is not second
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stage. Start-up rates (50 to 70 %) apply if market validation fails to
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produce buyer prices; second-stage rates once the plant runs and sells.
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Cross-check: a CAPM cost of equity, 2.30 % + beta x 6.18 %, with the EM
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unlevered beta relevered at 3:1 and 20 % tax (beta x (1 + 0.8 x 3)):
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Packaging & Container 0.61 to **2.08**, cost of equity **15.2 %**; Total
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Market 0.85 to **2.88**, **20.1 %**. The 10-year yield contains
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Thailand's default spread; netting it out, as Damodaran does, would
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lower both by about 1.3 points, so the gross yield is the cautious
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choice.
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- **E.** The calculator's project return against these rates.
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**unlevered** beta as it stands (no debt, so no relevering): Packaging
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& Container 0.61, cost of equity **6.1 %**; Total Market 0.85, **7.5 %**.
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CAPM prices market risk only: nothing for size, illiquidity or a plant
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not yet built, which is what the gap to the venture targets measures.
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The 10-year yield contains Thailand's default spread; netting it out,
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as Damodaran does, would lower both by about 1.3 points, so the gross
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yield is the cautious choice.
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- **E.** The calculator's project return, which with no loan is also the
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shareholders' return, against these rates.
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## Results
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### A. Founding round at par, pari passu (estimate)
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### A. Founding round at par, pari passu, all equity (estimate)
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| Case | Equity | Debt at most (3:1) | Shares at 100 THB | Lead investor, 60 % | Co-investors, 40 % | 25 % first payment |
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| Case | Share capital | Shares at 100 THB | Lead investor, 60 % | Co-investors, 40 % | 25 % first payment (40 %'s part) |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| **Plan B, all equity** (~217M) | **217.0M** | **2,170,000** | 1,302,000 shares, **130.2M** | 868,000 shares, **86.8M** | 54.25M (21.7M) |
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| Plan B before the reserve | 201.6M | 2,016,000 | 1,209,600 shares, 121.0M | 806,400 shares, 80.6M | 50.4M (20.2M) |
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| Plan A, all equity (comparison) | 182.0M | 1,820,000 | 1,092,000 shares, 109.2M | 728,000 shares, 72.8M | 45.5M (18.2M) |
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The price is **100 THB a share in every row**; a larger plan means more
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shares, not a different price. At the legal minimum par of 5 THB Plan B
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would be 43,400,000 shares at 5 THB: the same money for the same 40 %. In
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practice the registered capital is set to a round figure. The 40 % at
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par, ~86.8M THB, matches the plan's "at most ~87M" (total investment,
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Funding paragraph; business plan 12.2).
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**Which calls fall when** (illustrative; the calls follow the actual
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tranche releases). The tranche shares of business plan section 8.3 are
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ranges of the 201.6M before the reserve; the reserve is drawn from
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tranche 4 on. Phase 0 (tranche 0) is spent before the company exists: in
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the project calendar the company is incorporated after the BOI
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certificate, so the promoters pay phase 0 and the statutory meeting
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ratifies it (section 1108), reimbursed from the first call or credited as
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shares at par (B).
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| Call | When | Tranche need, M THB (share of 217M) | Call, share of 217M | Call, M THB | Lead investor, 60 % | The 40 % |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| **Plan B, 3:1 floor** (a quarter of 217M) | **54.25M** | 162.75M | **542,500** | 325,500 shares, **32.6M** | 217,000 shares, **21.7M** | 13.6M |
|
||||
| Plan B, equity a third | 72.3M | 144.7M | ~723,300 | ~434,000 shares, 43.4M | ~289,300 shares, 28.9M | 18.1M |
|
||||
| Plan B, equity a half | 108.5M | 108.5M | 1,085,000 | 651,000 shares, 65.1M | 434,000 shares, 43.4M | 27.1M |
|
||||
| Plan A, 3:1 floor (comparison) | 45.5M | 136.5M | 455,000 | 273,000 shares, 27.3M | 182,000 shares, 18.2M | 11.4M |
|
||||
| 1 | On subscription, at incorporation: tranche 1 (BOI certificate, lease, zoning, soil, pricing validated) with phase 0 | 41.6 to 63.1 (19 to 29 %) | **25 %**, the legal minimum | 54.25 | 32.55 | 21.70 |
|
||||
| 2 | Tranche 2: building permit, vendor build dates in writing | 70.6 to 90.7 (33 to 42 %) | 40 % | 86.80 | 52.08 | 34.72 |
|
||||
| 3 | Tranche 3: building watertight, first machinery shipped | 30.2 to 40.3 (14 to 19 %) | 20 % | 43.40 | 26.04 | 17.36 |
|
||||
| 4 | Tranche 4: metal path commissioned, first stampers; the reserve | 26.1 to 44.2 (12 to 20 %) | 15 % | 32.55 | 19.53 | 13.02 |
|
||||
| | **Total** | | **100 %** | **217.00** | **130.20** | **86.80** |
|
||||
|
||||
The price is **100 THB a share in every row**; more equity means more
|
||||
shares, not a different price. At the legal minimum par of 5 THB the
|
||||
floor would be 10,850,000 shares at 5 THB: the same money for the same
|
||||
40 %. In practice the registered capital is set to a round figure. The
|
||||
40 % at the floor, ~21.7M THB, matches the plan's "at most ~22M" (total
|
||||
investment, business plan 12.2).
|
||||
The 25 / 40 / 20 / 15 split is one fit to the tranche ranges, rounded to
|
||||
add up to 100 %; it is arithmetic, not a schedule. If tranche 1 lands at
|
||||
its high end, the first payment is set above the 25 % minimum (~29 %) or
|
||||
the second call comes forward. Each call needs at least 21 days' notice
|
||||
(section 1121), so a call goes out three weeks before the money is due
|
||||
to a vendor.
|
||||
|
||||
### B. Development premium (illustrative)
|
||||
|
||||
New cash at the floor, 54.25M; share count held at 542,500.
|
||||
New cash 217M (all equity); share count held at 2,170,000.
|
||||
|
||||
| Pre-money credited | Post-money | Price the cash pays | Premium over par | Shares to the developers (share of company) | The 40 % costs |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 0 (par) | 54.3M | 100 THB | 0 % | 0 | 21.7M |
|
||||
| 1.3M (phase 0, low end) | 55.6M | 102 THB | 2.4 % | 12,696 (2.3 %) | 22.2M |
|
||||
| 2.6M (phase 0, high end) | 56.9M | 105 THB | 4.8 % | 24,811 (4.6 %) | 22.7M |
|
||||
| 5M | 59.3M | 109 THB | 9.2 % | 45,781 (8.4 %) | 23.7M |
|
||||
| 10M | 64.3M | 118 THB | 18.4 % | 84,436 (15.6 %) | 25.7M |
|
||||
| 20M | 74.3M | 137 THB | 36.9 % | 146,128 (26.9 %) | 29.7M |
|
||||
| 0 (par) | 217.0M | 100 THB | 0 % | 0 | 86.8M |
|
||||
| 1.3M (phase 0, low end) | 218.3M | 100.6 THB | 0.6 % | 12,923 (0.6 %) | 87.3M |
|
||||
| 2.6M (phase 0, high end) | 219.6M | 101.2 THB | 1.2 % | 25,692 (1.2 %) | 87.8M |
|
||||
| 5M | 222.0M | 102 THB | 2.3 % | 48,874 (2.3 %) | 88.8M |
|
||||
| 10M | 227.0M | 105 THB | 4.6 % | 95,595 (4.4 %) | 90.8M |
|
||||
| 20M | 237.0M | 109 THB | 9.2 % | 183,122 (8.4 %) | 94.8M |
|
||||
|
||||
A premium must rest on documented costs or assets: invoices for the
|
||||
phase 0 work, time records at an agreed rate, the platform code and
|
||||
designs handed to the company. Money already spent on the company's
|
||||
behalf is most simply counted as capital at par or reimbursed as a
|
||||
promoter's expense ratified at the statutory meeting (section 1108);
|
||||
either way it gives the same 2 to 5 % as the phase 0 rows. Credit beyond
|
||||
documented spending is a valuation of work and needs a basis the other
|
||||
shareholders accept. Whose credit it is matters for the 60/40: founders'
|
||||
in-kind shares come out of the 40 % (at 10M they would be 15.6 % of the
|
||||
company, leaving 24.4 % for Ploy Printing and others), the lead
|
||||
investor's out of the 60 %. **For a company without a plant or revenue,
|
||||
the defensible default is par.**
|
||||
On a 217M round the pre-round work is a small share of the company: the
|
||||
phase 0 rows come to 0.6 to 1.2 %. A premium must still rest on
|
||||
documented costs or assets: invoices for the phase 0 work, time records at
|
||||
an agreed rate, the platform code and designs handed to the company.
|
||||
Money already spent on the company's behalf is most simply counted as
|
||||
capital at par or reimbursed as a promoter's expense ratified at the
|
||||
statutory meeting (section 1108); either way it gives the same 0.6 to
|
||||
1.2 %. Credit beyond documented spending is a valuation of work and needs
|
||||
a basis the other shareholders accept. Whose credit it is matters for the
|
||||
60/40: founders' in-kind shares come out of the 40 % (at 10M they would be
|
||||
4.4 % of the company, leaving 35.6 % for Ploy Printing and others), the
|
||||
lead investor's out of the 60 %. **For a company without a plant or
|
||||
revenue, the defensible default is par.**
|
||||
|
||||
### C. What a share could be worth once the plant runs (estimate)
|
||||
|
||||
Mature year, net debt **162.75M (nothing repaid)**, 542,500 shares paid at
|
||||
100 THB. Each cell: equity value before the discount; value per share
|
||||
after a 35 % to 20 % illiquidity discount; in brackets, the multiple on
|
||||
the 100 THB paid.
|
||||
Mature year, **net debt 0** (all equity), 2,170,000 shares paid at 100
|
||||
THB. Each cell: enterprise value, which is also the equity value; value
|
||||
per share after a 35 % to 20 % illiquidity discount; in brackets, the
|
||||
multiple on the 100 THB paid.
|
||||
|
||||
| Mature-year EBITDA | Thai listed peers, 4.7x | EM packaging, 13.3x | EM industry median, 14.9x |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **Adverse**, 0.23M USD (7.6M THB) | -127.2M: debt exceeds value, **share worth ~0** | -61.6M: **~0** | -49.5M: **~0** |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin, 20 % of central revenue, 0.73M USD (24.1M THB) | -49.8M: **~0** | 158.4M: 190 to 234 THB (1.9 to 2.3x) | 196.7M: 236 to 290 THB (2.4 to 2.9x) |
|
||||
| Central, 1.73M USD (57.1M THB) | 105.0M: 126 to 155 THB (1.3 to 1.5x) | 598.3M: 717 to 882 THB (7.2 to 8.8x) | 689.0M: 826 to 1,016 THB (8.3 to 10.2x) |
|
||||
| Favourable, 3.79M USD (125.1M THB) | 423.8M: 508 to 625 THB (5.1 to 6.3x) | 1,504.4M: 1,803 to 2,219 THB (18 to 22x) | 1,703.3M: 2,041 to 2,512 THB (20 to 25x) |
|
||||
| **Adverse**, 0.23M USD (7.6M THB) | 35.6M: **11 to 13 THB** (0.1x) | 101.2M: **30 to 37 THB** (0.3 to 0.4x) | 113.2M: **34 to 42 THB** (0.3 to 0.4x) |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin, 20 % of central revenue, 0.73M USD (24.1M THB) | 113.0M: 34 to 42 THB (0.3 to 0.4x) | 321.1M: 96 to 118 THB (1.0 to 1.2x) | 359.4M: 108 to 133 THB (1.1 to 1.3x) |
|
||||
| Central, 1.73M USD (57.1M THB) | 267.8M: **80 to 99 THB** (0.8 to 1.0x) | 761.0M: 228 to 281 THB (2.3 to 2.8x) | 851.8M: 255 to 314 THB (2.6 to 3.1x) |
|
||||
| Favourable, 3.79M USD (125.1M THB) | 586.6M: 176 to 216 THB (1.8 to 2.2x) | 1,667.2M: 499 to 615 THB (5.0 to 6.1x) | 1,866.0M: 559 to 688 THB (5.6 to 6.9x) |
|
||||
|
||||
Sensitivity, **half the debt repaid** (net debt 81.4M), value per share
|
||||
after the discount:
|
||||
What this means, plainly:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Without a loan the shares keep some value in the adverse case, but
|
||||
lose most of it**: 11 to 42 THB for every 100 THB paid, a loss of 58 to
|
||||
89 %. Nothing is owed ahead of the shareholders, so the plant's value
|
||||
is theirs; at the adverse EBITDA that value is small.
|
||||
- **At Thai listed multiples even the central case is below par** (80 to
|
||||
99 THB), and so is an industry-norm margin at that multiple (34 to 42);
|
||||
at the EM multiples the industry-norm margin is about par (96 to 133
|
||||
THB). Only the central case at an EM-industry multiple (2.3 to 3.1x)
|
||||
and the favourable case (1.8 to 6.9x) put a share clearly above what
|
||||
was paid.
|
||||
- **The large multiples of the earlier version of this page (7 to 25x
|
||||
par) came from leverage**, not from the plant: with three quarters
|
||||
borrowed, the same enterprise value, less the debt, was spread over a
|
||||
quarter of the shares. The table below shows that case.
|
||||
- The choice of multiple moves the result more than anything else: Thai
|
||||
listed plastics and packaging companies trade at 3 to 10x EBITDA, the
|
||||
EM industries at 12 to 25x.
|
||||
|
||||
**If a loan were added later (sensitivity, not the plan).** Equity at the
|
||||
3:1 ceiling, 54.25M (542,500 shares at 100 THB), debt 162.75M, nothing
|
||||
repaid, no loan terms assumed; value per share after the discount:
|
||||
|
||||
| Mature-year EBITDA | 4.7x | 13.3x | 14.9x |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Adverse | ~0 (equity -45.8M) | 24 to 29 THB (0.2 to 0.3x) | 38 to 47 THB (0.4 to 0.5x) |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin | 38 to 47 THB (0.4 to 0.5x) | 287 to 354 THB (2.9 to 3.5x) | 333 to 410 THB (3.3 to 4.1x) |
|
||||
| Central | 223 to 275 THB (2.2 to 2.7x) | 814 to 1,002 THB (8.1 to 10.0x) | 923 to 1,136 THB (9.2 to 11.4x) |
|
||||
| Favourable | 605 to 745 THB (6.1 to 7.5x) | 1,900 to 2,339 THB (19 to 23x) | 2,138 to 2,632 THB (21 to 26x) |
|
||||
| Adverse | ~0 (equity -127.2M) | ~0 (equity -61.6M) | ~0 (equity -49.5M) |
|
||||
| Industry-norm margin | ~0 (equity -49.8M) | 190 to 234 THB (1.9 to 2.3x) | 236 to 290 THB (2.4 to 2.9x) |
|
||||
| Central | 126 to 155 THB (1.3 to 1.5x) | 717 to 882 THB (7.2 to 8.8x) | 826 to 1,016 THB (8.3 to 10.2x) |
|
||||
| Favourable | 508 to 625 THB (5.1 to 6.3x) | 1,803 to 2,219 THB (18 to 22x) | 2,041 to 2,512 THB (20 to 25x) |
|
||||
|
||||
Read with the caveats: at the maximum debt the adverse case leaves the
|
||||
shares worth nothing at any multiple, and so does an industry-norm
|
||||
margin at Thai listed multiples. Leverage at 3:1 is what makes the
|
||||
central and favourable rows large: equity is a quarter of the funding,
|
||||
so every baht of enterprise value above the debt goes to a small equity
|
||||
base. The choice of multiple moves the result more than anything else:
|
||||
Thai listed plastics and packaging companies trade at 3 to 10x EBITDA,
|
||||
the EM industries at 12 to 25x.
|
||||
Leverage multiplies the good cases and wipes the shares out in the bad
|
||||
ones: the adverse case and an industry-norm margin at Thai listed
|
||||
multiples leave nothing for the shareholders once the debt is repaid,
|
||||
where all equity leaves 11 to 42 THB. Any interest and repayment would
|
||||
change these values either way; none is assumed.
|
||||
|
||||
### D. What a financial co-investor would pay today (estimate)
|
||||
|
||||
Year-5 equity value from C (nothing repaid, before the illiquidity
|
||||
discount), discounted over five years. Price per share justified against
|
||||
par (100 THB); a price above 100 means the round could carry a premium at
|
||||
that return, below 100 means par is already rich.
|
||||
Year-5 equity value from C (net debt 0, before the illiquidity discount),
|
||||
discounted over five years. Price per share justified against par (100
|
||||
THB); a price above 100 means the round could carry a premium at that
|
||||
return, below 100 means par is already rich.
|
||||
|
||||
| Year-5 equity, central case | First stage 40 % | First stage 60 % | CAPM 15.2 % | CAPM 20.1 % |
|
||||
| Year-5 equity, central case | First stage 40 % | First stage 60 % | CAPM 6.1 % | CAPM 7.5 % |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 4.7x, 105.0M | post-money 19.5M, **36 THB** | 10.0M, **18 THB** | 51.8M, 96 THB | 42.0M, 77 THB |
|
||||
| 13.3x, 598.3M | 111.2M, **205 THB** | 57.1M, **105 THB** | 295.4M, 544 THB | 239.2M, 441 THB |
|
||||
| 14.9x, 689.0M | 128.1M, **236 THB** | 65.7M, **121 THB** | 340.2M, 627 THB | 275.5M, 508 THB |
|
||||
| 4.7x, 267.8M | post-money 49.8M, **23 THB** | 25.5M, **12 THB** | 199.3M, 92 THB | 186.2M, 86 THB |
|
||||
| 13.3x, 761.0M | 141.5M, **65 THB** | 72.6M, **33 THB** | 566.5M, 261 THB | 529.1M, 244 THB |
|
||||
| 14.9x, 851.8M | 158.4M, **73 THB** | 81.2M, **37 THB** | 634.0M, 292 THB | 592.2M, 273 THB |
|
||||
|
||||
Other cases at the first-stage rates (40 % / 60 %): **adverse 0 at every
|
||||
multiple**; industry-norm margin 0 at 4.7x, 54 / 28 THB at 13.3x, 67 /
|
||||
35 THB at 14.9x; favourable 145 / 75 THB at 4.7x, 516 / 264 THB at 13.3x,
|
||||
584 / 299 THB at 14.9x. So a purely financial investor at first-stage
|
||||
target returns would pay **about par (105 to 236 THB) only if it believes
|
||||
the central case and an EM-industry multiple**; on the Thai listed
|
||||
multiple, or at an industry-norm margin, par is already rich (18 to 67
|
||||
THB). Pre-money values: negative wherever the price is below 100 (for
|
||||
example -44.2M at 4.7x and 60 %), +2.8M to +73.9M for the central case at
|
||||
the EM multiples.
|
||||
Other cases at the first-stage rates (40 % / 60 %): **adverse 3 / 2 THB
|
||||
at 4.7x, 9 / 4 at 13.3x, 10 / 5 at 14.9x**; industry-norm margin 10 / 5,
|
||||
28 / 14 and 31 / 16 THB; favourable 50 / 26 THB at 4.7x, 143 / 73 at
|
||||
13.3x, 160 / 82 at 14.9x. So a purely financial investor at first-stage
|
||||
target returns would pay **below par in every case but one**: the
|
||||
favourable case at an EM multiple and the lower 40 % rate (143 to 160
|
||||
THB). In the central case it would pay 12 to 73 THB, in the adverse case
|
||||
2 to 10. Pre-money values are negative wherever the price is below 100
|
||||
(for example -75.5M at 13.3x and 40 % in the central case). At the CAPM
|
||||
cost of equity, which prices market risk only, the central case is
|
||||
worth 86 to 292 THB today and the adverse case 11 to 39 THB. Ploy
|
||||
Printing as a supplier and the founders as operators have reasons to
|
||||
hold at par that a purely financial investor does not.
|
||||
|
||||
### E. Cross-check with the calculator
|
||||
|
||||
The calculator's ~22 % IRR and ~4.7M USD NPV at 10 % are a project return
|
||||
on the whole 6.56M USD, before tax and financing: it clears the
|
||||
unlevered cost of capital the market data give (2.30 % + 0.61 to 0.85 x
|
||||
6.18 % = 6.1 to 7.5 %) and the calculator's own 10 %, but sits well below
|
||||
the 40 to 60 % first-stage targets, so the calculator alone would not
|
||||
support a premium to a financial investor. Equity funded at 3:1 earns
|
||||
more than the project when the plant earns more than its loans cost and
|
||||
loses faster when it does not (the adverse rows in C); with no loan terms
|
||||
on file, no equity IRR is stated here.
|
||||
With no loan, **the shareholders' return is the project return**: the
|
||||
calculator's ~22 % IRR (pre-tax, no terminal value) and ~4.7M USD NPV at
|
||||
its 10 % discount rate are what the 217M of share capital (6.56M USD in
|
||||
year 0) earns before tax on the calculator's picture. That clears the
|
||||
CAPM cost of equity (6.1 to 7.5 %) and the calculator's 10 %, is close to
|
||||
the returns venture funds actually earned (16.9 to 21.4 %, Damodaran
|
||||
Table 3), and sits well below the 40 to 60 % first-stage targets, so the
|
||||
calculator alone would not support a premium to a financial investor.
|
||||
The 20 % corporate income tax (Group B, no CIT holiday on the core
|
||||
activity) lowers it: a rough check, tax on the calculator's yearly cash
|
||||
less straight-line depreciation over its 12.5 years (0.49M USD a year),
|
||||
gives **~18 % after tax** (estimate). The calculator's cash view is
|
||||
itself well above the revenue model's central EBITDA (2.23M against
|
||||
1.73M USD), so this return is not the honest case either; in the adverse
|
||||
case EBITDA pays the price back in ~37 years (revenue model).
|
||||
|
||||
## What it means
|
||||
|
||||
- **A founding round pari passu at par is the defensible default.** Until
|
||||
the plant exists, a share is worth the cash behind it. At par (100 THB)
|
||||
the 40 % costs ~21.7M THB at the 3:1 equity floor, ~28.9M at a third and
|
||||
~43.4M at a half, for 217,000, ~289,300 or 434,000 shares; the lead
|
||||
investor's 60 % costs one and a half times as much at the same price.
|
||||
The memorandum needs no premium clause for this.
|
||||
the 40 % is 868,000 shares for ~86.8M THB of Plan B's ~217M share
|
||||
capital, and the lead investor's 60 % is 1,302,000 shares for ~130.2M,
|
||||
the same price for everyone. The memorandum needs no premium clause for
|
||||
this.
|
||||
- **A development premium only for documented costs or assets.** Phase 0
|
||||
money (1.3M to 2.6M THB) is worth 2 to 5 % of the floor round and is
|
||||
most simply counted as capital at par. Anything above documented
|
||||
spending is a valuation of work; in-kind shares need their description
|
||||
before the statutory meeting (section 1108) or a special resolution
|
||||
later (section 1221), and a premium needs the memorandum's sanction
|
||||
(section 1105).
|
||||
money (1.3M to 2.6M THB) is 0.6 to 1.2 % of a 217M round and is most
|
||||
simply counted as capital at par. Anything above documented spending
|
||||
is a valuation of work; in-kind shares need their description before
|
||||
the statutory meeting (section 1108) or a special resolution later
|
||||
(section 1221), and a premium needs the memorandum's sanction (section
|
||||
1105).
|
||||
- **Later entrants pay a market-based price.** Once the plant runs and
|
||||
its accounts show the real EBITDA, the market multiples put a share
|
||||
anywhere from nothing to many times par, so shares issued after the
|
||||
founding round should be priced from results (C and D with actual
|
||||
figures), not at par. Statutory pre-emption (section 1222) lets the
|
||||
founding shareholders keep their share of such a round.
|
||||
- **The adverse case shows why co-investors need protection.** At the
|
||||
maximum debt the 3:1 rule allows, the adverse case and an
|
||||
industry-norm margin at Thai listed multiples leave the shares worth
|
||||
nothing, while the lead investor controls 60 % of the votes. Items for
|
||||
the shareholders' agreement: keep statutory pre-emption and do not
|
||||
waive it in the articles; information rights (monthly management
|
||||
accounts, the BOI progress and annual reports, the lender's reports
|
||||
once loans exist); a board seat or observer for the 40 %; reserved
|
||||
matters; and keep the three-quarters threshold for special resolutions
|
||||
(section 1194), which already gives the 40 % a say on capital increases,
|
||||
in-kind allotments and changes to the memorandum. Ploy Printing as a
|
||||
supplier and the founders as operators have reasons to hold at par that
|
||||
a purely financial investor does not (D).
|
||||
anywhere from a tenth of par to several times par, so shares issued
|
||||
after the founding round should be priced from results (C and D with
|
||||
actual figures), not at par. Statutory pre-emption (section 1222) lets
|
||||
the founding shareholders keep their share of such a round.
|
||||
- **The 40 % now carries four times the money, and needs protection to
|
||||
match.** All-equity funding puts ~86.8M THB into the 40 % instead of
|
||||
~21.7M at the old 3:1 floor, with no lender ahead of it; the adverse
|
||||
case still loses most of it, while the lead investor controls 60 % of
|
||||
the votes. Items for the shareholders' agreement: keep statutory
|
||||
pre-emption and do not waive it in the articles; information rights
|
||||
(monthly management accounts, the BOI progress and annual reports, the
|
||||
evidence for each tranche gate before its call); a board seat or
|
||||
observer for the 40 %; reserved matters; and keep the three-quarters
|
||||
threshold for special resolutions (section 1194), which already gives
|
||||
the 40 % a say on capital increases, in-kind allotments and changes to
|
||||
the memorandum.
|
||||
- **The call schedule belongs in the agreement.** The directors make the
|
||||
calls (section 1120) and the 60 % appoints most of them, so the
|
||||
agreement should tie each call to its tranche gate (business plan 8.3),
|
||||
make every call pro rata to all shareholders on the same date, and say
|
||||
what happens when a shareholder misses one. The Code's route is
|
||||
interest from the due date (section 1122), a second notice that can
|
||||
warn of forfeiture (1123), forfeiture (1124) and a public auction of
|
||||
the forfeited shares, the surplus returned (1125). The agreement can
|
||||
add who may take up a missed call or the forfeited shares first, so a
|
||||
stake does not pass to an outside bidder, and evidence that each
|
||||
shareholder can meet its calls: the lead investor carries 60 % of each
|
||||
one (~52M THB at the second call), so a missed call there would stall
|
||||
the build.
|
||||
|
||||
## Caveats
|
||||
|
||||
- **Not a valuation opinion, not an offer price.** Ranges and scenarios
|
||||
from public data and the plan's estimates, for discussion. No share
|
||||
price is agreed; it goes into the shareholders' agreement.
|
||||
- **No loan terms are on file.** Net debt is the most the 3:1 rule allows
|
||||
and one sensitivity; no interest rate, schedule or debt-service figure
|
||||
is assumed. Interest and repayment would change the year-5 net debt
|
||||
either way.
|
||||
- **No loan is planned and no loan terms are on file.** The levered table
|
||||
in C is a sensitivity at the most the 3:1 rule allows; no interest
|
||||
rate, schedule or debt-service figure is assumed.
|
||||
- **The extra cost of specials is not modelled** in the revenue model's
|
||||
direct cost, so every EBITDA here is an upper bound until compound
|
||||
quotes exist.
|
||||
- **Central is optimistic, adverse is honest.** The central EBITDA margin
|
||||
(~47 %) is far above the 15 to 25 % pressing plants earn and the 15 to
|
||||
18 % of the SET peers; the industry-norm row shows the difference.
|
||||
- **Contingency is not in the price.** At 15 % (~30M THB) a cost overrun
|
||||
funded by equity at par adds shares at 100 THB; funded by debt, it
|
||||
raises net debt and lowers every value in C and D.
|
||||
- **Contingency is not in the price.** At 15 % (~30M THB), an overrun
|
||||
funded by the shareholders at par adds ~300,000 shares at 100 THB
|
||||
(pro rata, the 60/40 holds) and lowers every per-share value in C and D
|
||||
by about an eighth; funded by a loan, it would add net debt instead.
|
||||
- **Cash is not counted.** Net debt 0 nets no cash: cash the plant earns
|
||||
before year 5 is assumed paid out (a return of its own, not in C) or
|
||||
spent on growth; cash kept in the company adds to the values.
|
||||
- **Market multiples are for listed companies**, most of them far larger
|
||||
than this plant; a small private company would usually be priced below
|
||||
them (estimate). The illiquidity discount covers
|
||||
part of that, not all. Damodaran's Emerging Markets set (27,360 firms)
|
||||
spans many countries and is not a Thai benchmark; the Thai listed peers
|
||||
are only three plastics and packaging companies, read from a secondary
|
||||
market-data site.
|
||||
them (estimate). The illiquidity discount covers part of that, not all.
|
||||
Damodaran's Emerging Markets set (27,360 firms) spans many countries and
|
||||
is not a Thai benchmark; the Thai listed peers are only three plastics
|
||||
and packaging companies, read from a secondary market-data site.
|
||||
- **Taxes and BOI**: EV/EBITDA is a pre-tax measure; the calculator is
|
||||
pre-tax and pre-financing. The tax at 20 % in the CAPM line assumes no
|
||||
CIT holiday on the core activity (Group B, [BOI](../boi.md)); any
|
||||
upgrade-measure exemption would raise after-tax values somewhat.
|
||||
pre-tax. The after-tax return in E assumes no CIT holiday on the core
|
||||
activity (Group B, [BOI](../boi.md)); any upgrade-measure exemption
|
||||
would raise it somewhat.
|
||||
- **Timing**: year 5 after the round is the plant's third or fourth year
|
||||
of sales (the build takes ~1.5 to 2 years), so a mature-year EBITDA by
|
||||
then is itself optimistic; each extra year of delay divides D's values
|
||||
by a further 1.4 to 1.6 at the first-stage rates.
|
||||
by a further 1.4 to 1.6 at the first-stage rates. The calculator puts
|
||||
all 6.56M USD in year 0; calling the capital over the build changes the
|
||||
IRR a little either way.
|
||||
- **Law**: the Code summaries are from English translations checked
|
||||
against the Thai text online; Thai counsel confirms them in phase 0,
|
||||
along with how BOI counts in-kind capital for the 3:1 ratio.
|
||||
along with the call and forfeiture mechanics in the articles and how
|
||||
BOI counts in-kind capital.
|
||||
@@ -144,14 +144,24 @@ most **40 % is for sale** to other shareholders. Ploy Printing's stake
|
||||
(cash, in kind or both), any founders' shares and any further
|
||||
co-investor all come out of that 40 %. BOI promotion permits up to 100 %
|
||||
foreign ownership of the promoted activity ([BOI](../boi.md)), so the
|
||||
split needs no particular nationality on either side. With BOI's 3:1
|
||||
debt-to-equity ceiling Plan B needs at least ~54M THB of equity; if all
|
||||
of it were paid in at one share price, the main investor's 60 % would be
|
||||
at least ~32M THB and the 40 % at most ~22M THB (arithmetic only: the
|
||||
share price, the valuation, the total equity above the floor and any
|
||||
founders' or in-kind shares are not agreed). The terms go into the
|
||||
shareholders' agreement (business plan section 12.2). Possible share
|
||||
prices for the 40 % from market data: [share price](share-price.md).
|
||||
split needs no particular nationality on either side.
|
||||
|
||||
**Funding (user, 20 October 2026): the shareholders fund the whole plant
|
||||
and get shares for it; no bank loan is planned.** Plan B's ~217M THB is
|
||||
paid in as share capital, so at one share price the main investor's 60 %
|
||||
is at least **~130M THB** and the 40 % at most **~87M THB** (~121M and
|
||||
~81M on the 201.6M before the ramp-up reserve; Plan A for comparison:
|
||||
~109M and ~73M of ~182M). Arithmetic only: the share price, any
|
||||
founders' or in-kind shares and the call schedule are not agreed. BOI's
|
||||
3:1 debt-to-equity ceiling is met with room to spare (no debt), so it no
|
||||
longer sets an equity floor; the machinery, and in Plan B the owned PV
|
||||
array and battery, stay unpledged and could secure a loan later if one
|
||||
is ever needed. Thai company law lets the capital be registered in full
|
||||
and called in instalments (at least 25 % on subscription, the rest called
|
||||
by the directors), which fits releasing the money in tranches against
|
||||
milestones. The terms go into the shareholders' agreement (business plan
|
||||
section 12.2). Possible share prices from market data:
|
||||
[share price](share-price.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Decided (user, October 2026): the business plan comes in **two
|
||||
versions** for the investor, built from the same documents:
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user