cnx.router.proxy serves <service>.<site><n>.cnx.network with a real Let's Encrypt wildcard obtained via a gateway-scoped TSIG key against ns1; Blocky resolves the names to the router's LAN address, so they exist only internally. First user: Omada UI on gw-cnx-1 (omada.cnx1.cnx.network).
142 lines
5.3 KiB
Nix
142 lines
5.3 KiB
Nix
# Internal reverse proxy for the gateway: Caddy terminates TLS for
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# <service>.<site><siteId>.cnx.network (e.g. omada.cnx1.cnx.network) and
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# forwards to backends by their internal address. The cert is a real Let's
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# Encrypt wildcard (*.<site><siteId>.cnx.network) obtained via ACME DNS-01
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# against ns1 with a gateway-scoped TSIG key, so browsers trust it without
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# any CA install; the names only *resolve* internally — Blocky answers them
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# with the router's LAN address, the public zone never carries them.
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#
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# Requires the machine to also import the shared secret generator:
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# (import ../../modules/dns/acme-gw-secret.nix "<hostname>")
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# and ns1 to hold the matching key + acl (see machines/ns1/configuration.nix).
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{
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config,
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lib,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.cnx.router;
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hosts = import ../hosts.nix;
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hostname = config.networking.hostName;
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tsigKey = "acme_${lib.replaceStrings [ "-" ] [ "_" ] hostname}";
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certName = "${cfg.site}${toString cfg.siteId}.cnx.network";
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serviceModule = {
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options = {
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backend = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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example = "https://127.0.0.1:8043";
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description = "URL Caddy forwards to (internal/mesh address).";
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};
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insecureSkipVerify = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.bool;
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default = false;
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description = "Skip TLS verification towards the backend (self-signed upstreams like Omada).";
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};
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};
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};
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in
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{
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options.cnx.router.proxy = {
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enable = lib.mkEnableOption "internal reverse proxy (Caddy, wildcard cert via DNS-01)";
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services = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.attrsOf (lib.types.submodule serviceModule);
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default = { };
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description = "Proxied services; attr name becomes <name>.${certName}.";
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};
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allowVlans = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
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default = [
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"mgmt"
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"lan"
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];
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description = "VLANs whose clients may reach the proxy (443, plus 80 for the redirect).";
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf (cfg.enable && cfg.proxy.enable) {
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assertions = [
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{
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assertion = lib.all (v: cfg.vlans ? ${v}) cfg.proxy.allowVlans;
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message = "cnx.router.proxy.allowVlans must name VLANs defined in cnx.router.vlans.";
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}
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];
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# Render the shared per-gateway TSIG secret into a lego rfc2136 env file;
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# same pattern as web01 (modules/web-proxy.nix), scoped on ns1 to
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# _acme-challenge.<site><siteId> TXT records only.
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clan.core.vars.generators."dns-acme-${hostname}-rfc2136" = {
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files."rfc2136.env".secret = true; # root-owned; systemd reads it as root
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dependencies = [ "dns-acme-${hostname}-secret" ];
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script = ''
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printf 'RFC2136_NAMESERVER=${hosts.ns1.ipv4}:53\nRFC2136_TSIG_ALGORITHM=hmac-sha256.\nRFC2136_TSIG_KEY=${tsigKey}\nRFC2136_TSIG_SECRET=%s\n' \
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"$(cat "$in"/dns-acme-${hostname}-secret/secret)" > "$out"/rfc2136.env
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'';
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};
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security.acme = {
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acceptTerms = true;
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defaults.email = "postmaster@cnx.email";
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# One wildcard for every proxied service; DNS-01 against ns1, so issuance
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# works behind PPPoE with no inbound reachability at all.
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certs.${certName} = {
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domain = "*.${certName}";
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dnsProvider = "rfc2136";
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environmentFile =
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config.clan.core.vars.generators."dns-acme-${hostname}-rfc2136".files."rfc2136.env".path;
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# ns1 is the only nameserver that accepts this key's UPDATE; check
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# propagation against it directly rather than a public resolver.
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dnsResolver = "${hosts.ns1.ipv4}:53";
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# Caddy reads the cert from explicit file paths (tls directive below),
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# so it won't notice a renewal on its own.
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reloadServices = [ "caddy.service" ];
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};
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};
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# The lego-issued cert is owned group=acme; Caddy needs to read the key.
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users.users.caddy.extraGroups = [ "acme" ];
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# The explicit `tls cert key` points Caddy at the wildcard cert and disables
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# its automatic ACME, so no extra issuance happens.
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services.caddy = {
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enable = true;
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virtualHosts = lib.mapAttrs' (
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name: svc:
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lib.nameValuePair "${name}.${certName}" {
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extraConfig = ''
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tls /var/lib/acme/${certName}/cert.pem /var/lib/acme/${certName}/key.pem
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${
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if svc.insecureSkipVerify then
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''
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reverse_proxy ${svc.backend} {
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transport http {
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tls_insecure_skip_verify
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}
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}''
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else
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"reverse_proxy ${svc.backend}"
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}
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'';
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}
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) cfg.proxy.services;
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};
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# Blocky answers <anything>.<site><siteId>.cnx.network (customDNS covers
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# subdomains) with the router's LAN address — clients on any allowed VLAN
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# reach that address through the router's input path.
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services.blocky.settings.customDNS.mapping.${certName} = cfg.vlans.lan.address;
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# 443 serves the proxy; 80 only carries Caddy's automatic HTTP->HTTPS
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# redirect. mgmt is already a trusted interface; listed anyway so shrinking
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# trustedInterfaces later doesn't silently break the proxy.
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networking.firewall.interfaces = lib.genAttrs (map (v: "vlan-${v}") cfg.proxy.allowVlans) (_: {
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allowedTCPPorts = [
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80
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443
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];
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});
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};
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}
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