web01 terminates TLS for grafana.cnx.network and proxies to Grafana on
control over the mesh. Caddy serves a *.cnx.network wildcard cert obtained
via ACME DNS-01, using a dedicated acme_web01 TSIG key scoped on ns1 to
_acme-challenge on the cnx.network zone only. Ports 80/443 are the only
public exposure (80 just redirects); admin and the backend ride ZeroTier.
Also reload Caddy on cert renewal for both web01 and mx1, since both
reference the cert via explicit tls file paths and would otherwise keep
serving a stale cert after a silent renewal.
A mail.cnx.email CNAME (-> mx1.cnx.email) lets clients (Thunderbird etc.)
use a friendly hostname for submission/IMAP. To avoid a TLS name
mismatch the cert now carries mail.cnx.email as a SAN, so the acme_mx1
key is authorized to write _acme-challenge.mail too. The MX still points
at mx1.cnx.email and --reuse-key keeps the DANE TLSA digest valid across
the re-issue.
mx1 runs Simple NixOS Mailserver (Postfix/Dovecot/Rspamd/OpenDKIM) for
cnx.email. The TLS cert is obtained via ACME DNS-01 using a dedicated,
scoped TSIG key (acme_mx1) that ns1 authorizes for only
_acme-challenge.mx1 and _acme-challenge.mta-sts on the cnx.email zone, so
the credential can write nothing else. Mailbox passwords are auto-minted
by a clan vars generator (four-word passphrase + number).
DANE TLSA (3 1 1) is published for _25._tcp.mx1; --reuse-key keeps the
key digest stable across renewals. MTA-STS is enforced via a Caddy vhost
serving the policy on :443 from the same cert (mta-sts SAN). Firewall
opens 25/587/465/143/993/443; 80 stays closed.
- Register mx1 in the inventory and as a direct-SSH `internet` host; give it
a static public IPv6 (2a01:4ff:2f0:1963::1).
- Point the cnx.email MX (plus SPF/DMARC) at mx1 and add its A record.
- Bring mx1 into monitoring: import exporters, add it to the mesh map and the
node scrape job so its host metrics and journald reach control.
- Add a clan-mx1 Hetzner firewall: inbound SMTP + ZeroTier + ICMP, no public
SSH (admin rides the mesh like the other hosts). 587/465/993 held for now.
- Extract per-host public IPv4/IPv6 into modules/hosts.nix, consumed by
clan.nix's internet hosts and each machine's cnx.staticIPv6, so each address
is declared once instead of being duplicated across configs.
- docs: add mx1 to the machines table.
clan borgbackup instance: control serves repos, ns1 backs up its
clan.core.state (the KASP keystore at /var/lib/knot) nightly over the
mesh with repokey encryption. ns1 maps the control machine name to its
ZeroTier address so the borg@control repo resolves.
Run `clan vars generate ns1` before deploy to mint the borg keypair.
control runs VictoriaMetrics (loopback) and Grafana; every machine exports
node metrics and the nameservers export Knot stats (mod-stats + knot-exporter).
Scraping and the Grafana UI ride the ZeroTier mesh only, scoped by nftables to
the mesh /88; the public side stays closed by the Hetzner cloud firewall. The
provisioned DNS dashboard includes a per-zone SOA serial table to catch
primary/secondary drift. ZeroTier ULAs are centralised in mesh-hosts.nix.
dateserial (YYYYMMDDnn) only has a 2-digit same-day counter held in Knot's
journal; a journal reset restarted the counter and let ns1 mint a serial ns2
had already seen with older content, so ns2 never retransferred. unixtime is
strictly monotonic per reload, eliminating the shared-serial collision.
Add a dedicated acme_ddns TSIG key (scoped to ns1 only) and an acl_acme rule
that limits it to TXT updates at or under _acme-challenge.<zone>. An external
ACME client can now write challenge records via RFC 2136; Knot signs them and
transfers to ns2, which never holds the key.
ns1 (primary) now signs every zone with an ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 policy and
manages the SOA serial itself: zonefile-load = difference-no-serial (with
journal-content = all) plus serial-policy = dateserial let records be edited
without bumping the serial by hand. ns2 needs no change; it transfers the
already-signed zone.
Also point the ns1/ns2 AAAA glue at the public Hetzner IPv6 addresses; they
previously pointed at unroutable ZeroTier mesh ULAs.
- Knot authoritative DNS: ns1 primary, ns2 secondary serving cnx.network,
buildfor.life and cnx.email over TSIG-secured zone transfer (modules/dns)
- Knot listens publicly + over ZeroTier; firewall opens port 53
- Complete clan inventory: name/domain, admin SSH key, control as the
zerotier controller, tor on all nixos machines
- Enable age yubikey/fido2-hmac secret plugins
Berwn
kurogeek